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The Uncertain Scope of Revised Article 9's
Statutory Prohibition of Exculpatory
Breach of Peace Clauses
Michael Korybut*
Maybe you have seen the reality TV repossession show where two
burly, scary-looking guys repossess some person's family car or her
business inventory. As agents for a secured lender with a lien on the
person's (the debtor's) personal property, the repo men will sometimes
find that property (collateral) in a public space, like a car parked on a
public street. Other times, however, the collateral will be in the debtor's
residential property or commercial property, be it on land (driveway, a
field) or a structure like a home or a business. In these cases, the repo
guys must enter private property to affect their repossession, in some
cases breaking locks to access the property. Sometimes the debtor is not
present when the repossession occurs. Other times, the debtor is present
but does not object to the entry and repossession; other times he
vigorously objects. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs
such repossessions, and states that the repo men cannot "breach the
peace" while engaged in their repossession efforts. If their behavior
crosses the legal line and becomes a breach of the peace, they may be
liable for trespass, conversion, breaking and entering, assault or battery,
and damages.'
Imagine, though, that the security agreement signed by the debtor
has a clause stating that "[i]t shall be lawful for [the secured party or
agent] to take possession of the Mortgaged Property, at any time
wherever it may be and to enter any premises . . . without liability for
trespass . .. ."2 Given the clause, can the repo men without the debtor's
contemporaneous consent break a door lock and enter the debtor's
* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. LARY LAWRENCE, 11 ANDERSON ON TIE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-609:16 (3d. ed.
2011) [hereinafter 11 Anderson U.C.C.].
2. Wombles Charters, Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 599, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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business premises to repossess equipment collateral, and not be liable for
breach of the peace?
The clause in question comes from Wombles Charters, a 1990 case
out of New York. Relying in part on this clause, the Wombles court
found no breach of peace had occurred where the secured party had cut
a lock to enter the debtor's commercial property to repossess a bus.
Neither the debtor nor any third party was present to object or consent
to these acts, but well-marked "No Trespassing" signs were on the
property. Wombles is one of a trilogy of New York cases condoning
similar exculpatory repossession clauses in similar commercial premises
settings. In the New York trilogy cases, each secured party entered the
debtor's owned or leased commercial premises when the debtor (or her
agent) was not present. Each court explicitly found that the likelihood
of violence was low. Each court, by omission, implicitly acknowledged
that the harm to the debtor's real property was minimal, and in each
case the debtor was a non-consumer debtor.3 This Article calls these
Wombles-like circumstances. On a more ad hoc basis, a few courts in
jurisdictions besides New York have condoned similar clauses in similar
Wombles-like circumstances. 4
Wombles was decided under former Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which was revised significantly in 2001. Neither
former nor Revised Article 9 defines the meaning of "breach of the
peace," deliberately leaving the task to the courts of each state. Thus,
each state developed to varying extents case law jurisprudence on the
meaning of "breach of the peace" and concomitantly, the enforceability
of exculpatory repossession clauses like Wombles' that defined the
contours of "breach of the peace" or authorized certain repossession acts
or conduct. However, in the 2001 Article 9 revisions, the drafters
created a new statutory prohibition of contractual waivers, variances,
and standards measuring the fulfillment of the secured party's duty not
to breach the peace while repossessing its collateral.5 While there is
sparse case law and no substantial, in depth, academic or practitioner
analysis on the new statutory prohibition, most commentators have
characterized the new provision as very robust, invalidating contractual
definitions of the term breach of the peace, as well as contractual
3. See infra, notes 39-75, 202-07, and accompanying text.
4. See infra, note 76, and accompanying text.
5. See infra, notes 83-45, and accompanying text.
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authorization of acts that otherwise would be a breach of the peace. 6
Given this ascribed very robust nature, it would appear that there
remains no room under Revised Article 9 for the use of Wombles-like
exculpatory clauses in Wombles-like circumstances. Thus, it would seem
clear that Wombles and like cases would no longer be good law under the
new statutory prohibition for the argument that a Wombles-like
exculpatory clause would be valid when applied in Wombles-like
circumstances. For example, in their 2011 textbook Secured
Transactions in Personal Property, Professors Warren and Walt pose a
problem whose facts are based closely on Wombles', and which
substantively sets forth the same repossession clause as in Wombles.7
They ask whether the secured party's conduct (lock cutting) amounts to
a breach of the peace, and advise students to look to Section 9-602(6)
and Section 9-603(b), two of the foundational provisions of the Revised
Article 9's new statutory prohibition. They say further that "[tihe court
in Wombles said that there was no threat of violence and no breach of
the peace. It gave weight to the exculpatory clause. This would be difficult
to do under [Revised] 9-602(6) and 9-603(b)."8 Manifestly, these
professors fall within the majority of commentators viewing the new
statutory prohibition as very robust. In particular, they believe that a
Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances is not effective under
the Revised Article 9. Yet beyond their brief discussion, they do not
explain why Sections 9-602(6) and 9-603(b) would "make it difficult" for
a court to give "exculpatory power" to a Wombles-like clause in
Wombles-like circumstances.
Despite the apparent majority view that the new statutory
prohibition is very robust, in particular Professors Warren and Walt's
view that Wombles is no longer good law for the proposition that a
secured party permissibly may use a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like
circumstances, a review of the academic and practitioner literatures
reveals some dissenting voices. If these were the passing comments of
Article 9 amateurs, then perhaps they could be dismissed as such. But
the apparent dissenting voices are those of esteemed commercial law
academics and practitioners, and so cannot be taken lightly. For
6. See infra, notes 86-92, 179, 245-47, and accompanying text.
7. WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL.
PROPErY 269 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter WAREN & WALT, S ECUR E) TRANSAcIONS].
8. TEACHER'S MANUAL TO WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALr, SECUREI)
TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 112 (8th ed. 2011) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
WA R EN & WALT, TEACHER'S MANUAL].
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example, contrast Professors Warren and Walts' view with that of
Professors Warren (now Massachusetts Senator Warren) and Lopucki.
In their 2012 textbook Secured Credit, A Systems Approach, they discuss
Revised Section 9-609 and what conduct constitutes a breach of the
peace. 9 While doing so, they very briefly summarize a number of breach
of peace cases, including Wombles.' 0 They also set forth a breach of
peace problem with varying circumstances and questions. In part 3.2.d
of the problem, they pose the scenario of a secured party wanting to
repossess a bulldozer owned by the debtor where the debtor keeps it "in
a locked, steel building on the debtor's own property."II They state that
"[ilf our security agreement has a provision in it authorizing us to pick
the lock-or even cut it-Wombles Charters v. Orix Credit Alliance . . . is
authorityfor doing it. Of course, if there is a confrontation, we will have
to withdraw." 2 The emphasized language suggests that Professors
Warren and Lopucki believe that Wombles remains good law (it "is
authority"; present tense) for the proposition that under Revised Article
9 a secured party permissibly may use a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-
like circumstances. They do not, however, explain why this is so; but
evidently they view the prohibition's scope as less robust in certain
circumstances than many other commentators, including Professors
Warren and Walt.
Here then is the genesis of this Article: Two sets of well-regarded
commercial law academics appear to have starkly different views about
whether a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances would
survive judicial scrutiny under Revised Article 9. Yet neither set
provides in their respective textbooks or accompanying Teacher's
Manuals sufficient application of the Revised Article 9's Sections 9-602
and 9-603 to understand the doctrinal (or normative) basis' for their
respective, conflicting positions. Considered together with other
examples of dissention' 3 from the apparent consensus of a robust
Revised Article 9 prohibition, these conflicting views demand attention
and explication.
9. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMs APPROACH 54
(7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WARREN & LOPUCKI, SECURED CREDIT].
10. WARREN & LOPUCKI, SECURED CREDIT, supra note 9, at 48.
11. Id. at 54.
12. TEACHER'S MANUAL TO LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH 37-38 (7th ed. 2012) (emphasis added) [hereinafter WARREN & LOPUCKI,
TEACHER'S MANUAL].
13. See infra notes 106-15, and accompanying text.
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This Article takes up the challenge. Beyond addressing the battle
of these professorial commercial law titans over whether and when a
Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances is prohibited under
Revised Article 9, providing this explication is particularly important,
since one can find repossession clauses both similar and dissimilar to the
Wombles clause not only in cases decided under the former and Revised
Article 9, but also in negotiated documents, model form documents, and
a variety of treatises and other academic and practitioner publications.14
Unfortunately, only a few courts have cited to the Revised Article 9
sections constituting the new statutory prohibition, and none have
thoroughly addressed its meaning, scope and application. The lack of
case law, as well as conflicting academic and practitioner views, such as
those above, may cause uncertainty and a lack of predictability for both
secured creditors and debtors drafting repossession clauses, and courts
reviewing such clauses. Through its explication of the possible doctrinal
(and normative) reasons for the battle of the professorial titans and
other examples of these conflicting views, the Article seeks to mitigate
this uncertainty and unpredictability.
Part I provides a primer on repossession rules under the former and
the Revised Article 9. It also summarizes the New York trilogy cases.
Part II provides a more detailed review of Revised Article 9's new
statutory prohibition on exculpatory breach of peace clauses, and the
apparent consensus that the prohibition is very robust. Part III reveals
important, dissenting voices to this apparent consensus (including those
of Professors Warren and Lopucki). To explicate the possible doctrinal
(and normative) reasons animating these conflicting views, Part IV,
Sections A and B together perform a straight statutory application of
the new statutory prohibition's requirements to a Wombles-like case
with a Wombles-like clause. The core question addressed is whether
under the Revised Article 9, a New York court in 2014 could reach the
same no breach of peace holding in partial reliance on the exculpatory
clause as did the 1990 Wombles under the former Article 9. Section C
uses an alternative clause validity test called the Otherwise BOP test,
derived from the new statutory prohibition and the literature, to explore
the same core question and provide additional explanations for the
battle of the professorial titans. Section D discusses how differing
analyses/tests performed from different temporal perspectives (ex ante
14. See infra notes 78-81, and accompanying text.
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before a repossession has occurred vs. ex post after the repossession has
occurred) may lead to opposite clause validity outcomes. In turn, this
may explain some of the conflicting views about whether and when a
Wombles-like clause under Wombles-like circumstances is prohibited
under Revised Article 9. Section D closes with some normative
questions about how to resolve the doctrinal conflicts identified in Part
IV.
I. ARTICLE 9 REPOSSESSION RULES PRIMER
A. THE STATUTE
Under Revised Section 9-601(a), "[a]fter default, a secured party has
the rights provided in this part [,Part 6,] and, except as otherwise
provided in Revised Section 9-602, those provided by agreement of the
parties."15 Thus, a secured party has Part 6 post-default statutory rights,
and, except as provided in Revised Section 9-602, any post-default
contractual rights agreed to by the parties. Similarly, Revised Section 9-
601(d) says, in relevant part, that "after default, a debtor and an obligor
have the rights provided in this part and by agreement of the parties."' 6
Former Article 9, Section 9-501 contained very similar rules.' 7
An important secured party post-default statutory right is self-help
repossession of the debtor's personal property (the collateral) securing
the debt. Revised Section 9-609(a) states that after a debtor's default,
"a secured party [without judicial process] (1) may take possession of
the collateral; and (2) without removal, may render equipment unusable
and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises under Section 9-610."i8
Former Section 9-503 contained a very similar rule.19
Neither Revised Section 9-609, nor former Section 9-503, explicitly
provides the secured party after default the right to enter the debtor's
premises to repossess collateral. 20 However, in a variety of ways and to
varying degrees, many courtS2 1 and commentatorS22 say that from the
15. U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (1999).
16. Id. at § 9-601(d).
17. U.C.C. § 9-501 (1995).
18. U.C.C. § 9-609(a) (1999).
19. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995).
20. Section 9-609(a) permits the secured party to "render equipment unusable and dispose of
collateral on a debtor's premises under Section 9-610," "but does not grant explicit permission to
enter those premises."
21. For cases, see, e.g., Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So.2d 750, 22 UCC Rep. Serv.
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secured party's statutory right to repossess the collateral comes a
derivative right (sometimes called a privilege) to enter the debtor's
premises where the collateral is located without the debtor's
contemporaneous consent.2 3 The scope of this right (license) differs
depending on the nature of the premises to be entered (i.e., land vs.
home vs. business) and the conduct in question (non-forceful vs. forceful
entry). 4  So, for example, many courts say that the secured party has a
1298, Fla. App. 1977 (holding that "absent a contrary agreement, when a security agreement provides
the secured party has on default the rights and remedies provided by the UCC, the right of repossession
stated by [former Section 9-503] implies, just as it did at common law, a limited privilege to enter on
the debtor's land. The privilege may be exercised only 'without breach of the peace."'); Sperry v. ITT
Commercial Fin. Corp. 799 S.W.2d 871, 876-877 (Mo. App. 1990)(stating that the secured party "had
an absolute legal privilege to enter [the debtor's] property to peacefully repossess all collateral in the
event of default"); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ryan, 189 Ohio App. 3d 560, 939 N.E.2d 891, 72 UCC
Rep. Serv. 2d 977, (2010) (stating that "[i]ndced, R.C. 1309.609 gives a repossessor a privilege to enter
another's land to effectuate a repossession, so long as the repossessor does not breach the peace); In re
Bolin & Co., LLC 437 B.R. 731, 766, n.15 (D. Conn. 2010) (stating that "that the security agreement,
by its incorporation of the UCC and its self-help provisions, permitted her [the secured party] to enter
Bolin's premises and take the store's inventory as collateral . . . .").
22. As to commentators, Professor Lloyd states that "there are.two theories upon which courts
have allowed repossessors to enter upon the debtor's premises for the purposes of repossessing the
collateral. Some courts have acknowledged that the repossessor may be trespassing by entering on
the debtor's property, but they have nonetheless held that it does not constitute a breach of the
peace; the vindication of the secured party's right to the collateral is more important than the
trespass. Other courts have held that there was no trespass because the debtor consented to the
entry onto the land. The consent may be express, where a clause in the security agreement
specifically authorizes the secured party to enter the land where the collateral is located for the
purpose of repossessing it, or it may be implied from the grant of the security interest itself. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts espouses this view, giving the secured party a privilege to enter upon
the debtor's land to repossess chattels. Robert M. Lloyd, Wrongful Repossession in Tennessee, 65
TENN. L. REV. 761, 773-74 , 1998). See also CAROLYN L. CA RTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTII.,
REPOSSESSIONS, § 6.4.4.2, at 205 (6th ed. 2005) ("When there is a limited entry onto the debtor's
property, such as the debtor's driveway, carport, or open garage, the creditor is said to have an
implied limited privilege peacefully to trespass and take possession of the collateral, as long as the
debtor does not object and no breach of the peace is committed while on the land."); Stephen L.
Sepinuck, When to Contract for Remedies, 3 TiHE TRANSACTIONAl LAWYER 4 (June 2013) (stating
"Expressly authorize the secured party and its representatives to enter the debtor's property after
default to repossess collateral. Section 9-609 grants a secured party the right to take possession of
collateral after default, provided it acts without a breach of the peace. One factor relevant to
whether a breach of the peace occurs is the existence and extent of a trespass. While a secured
party probably has a license to enter the debtor's driveway or carport even without express
authorization . . ., entering a garage or other structure is more problematic. . . .").
23. As to the need to acquire the debtor's consent to enter and repossess, see generally JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 34-8, at 384 (5th ed. 2002) (stating
that "In most cases, to determine if a breach of the peace has occurred, courts inquire mainly into:
(1) whether there was entry by the creditor upon the debtor's premises; and (2) whether the debtor
or one acting on his behalf consented (or objected) to the entry and repossession."). See also Sperry,
799 S.W.2d at 879 (stating that "as a matter of law, neither a demand for repossession nor consent
of the debtor is required before the creditor is entitled to take possession.").
24. See, e.g., id. (stating that "In general, the creditor may not enter the debtor's home or garage
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right of entry onto the debtor's residential and commercial land without
the debtor's contemporaneous consent;25 but all courts prohibit entry
into the debtor's residential structure without his contemporaneous
consent. 26 Some courts say the secured party may enter the debtor's
business structure without the debtor's (or her agent's)
contemporaneous consent; 27 other courts require such contemporaneous
consent in certain circumstances.2 8 Finally, all other things being equal,
forceful entries are more problematic than non-forceful entries.29
without permission, but he can probably take a car from the debtor's driveway without incurring
liability. As one moves away from the residence itself to the yard, the driveway, and finally the public
street, the debtor's argument [for breach of the peace] becomes progressively more tenuous.");
LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 7:81 (Database updated
November 2012) (stating that "It is less clear whether entry into structures other than residences
constitutes a breach of the peace. Forcible entry generally results in a finding of a breach of the peace
as, for example, when the creditor breaks into a locked garage. A few courts have apparently made a
distinction between residential and commercial structures and have not found a breach of the peace
even where there has been a forcible entry into a commercial structure. On the other hand, forcible
entry by breaking a lock to gain entrance onto the debtor's residential property has been found to be a
breach of the peace, even if entry is into an open fenced area. Entry into an open area, including the
debtor's property, without forced entry or any of the acts of violence described earlier such as
threatened violence or debtor resistance, would probably not be considered a breach of the peace.").
25. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 22, at 773-74 (stating that "Most jurisdictions allow the secured
party or its agent to enter upon the debtor's land to repossess the collateral as long as it does not
enter a closed building or break a lock . . . .").
26. See e.g., id. at 774-75 (stating that "Under any theory, however, the secured party may not
enter into a dwelling to effect a repossession unless the occupants of the dwelling are present and freely
consent to the repossession. Even if the security agreement contains a clause purporting to grant
permission to enter the debtor's dwelling, courts will not give effect to such clauses. If the consent to
enter on the debtor's premises is implied from the grant of the security interest, the consent is "limited
to those acts that are within a fair and reasonable interpretation of the terms of the grant." If the
court is balancing the secured party's interest in recovering the collateral against the trespass, the
secured party's interest will outweigh only limited and relatively harmless trespasses, not an entry into
a dwelling."); Ahern, supra note 24, at § 7:81 (stating that "a review of case law indicates that the
following acts are likely to give rise to a finding of a breach of the peace ... (5) entry into a residence
without the voluntary consent of the debtor at the time of repossession.").
27. For cases see, e.g., In re Bolin & Co., LLC, 437 B.R. 731, 766, n. 15 (D. Conn. 2010) (stating
that "that the security agreement, by its incorporation of the UCC and its self-help provisions,
permitted her to enter Bolin's premises and take the store's inventory as collateral
. ..... For commentators, see, e.g., supra note 24, and accompanying text.
28. See generally LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
SECURI) TRANSACTIONS 143 (Thomson/West 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter RUSCiH & SEPINUCK,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS] ("One fact that is often relevant in breach of peace litigation is the
degree of any trespass involved. Courts treat trespass as serious, but not determinative, of whether
a breach of peace has occurred. While it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about what creditors
may and may not do, it does appear that commercial premises are a better target than residential
premises. Accessing open or unlocked property is better than breaking open locked structures. And
entering a detached garage is better than entering a home. In fact, creditors should never enter the
home without consent."). See, e.g., supra note 24, and accompanying text.
29. RUSCH & SEPINUCK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 28, at 134. See, e.g., supra notes
24, 28, and accompanying text.
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B. No BREACH OF PEACE DUTY
Revised Section 9-609(b)(2) significantly limits the secured party's
statutory right of self-help repossession and derivative right (privilege)
to enter the debtor's premises by imposing on her or her agent the duty
to refrain from breaching the peace while repossessing collateral.
Section 9-609(b)(2) in relevant part states that after a debtor's default,
"a secured party (1) may take possession of the collateral . . . without
judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace."30 Former
Article 9 Section 9-503 stated in relevant part "[u]nless otherwise
agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateral [and] may proceed without judicial process if this can be done
without breach of the peace. . . ."3i
With few exceptions, 32 neither Revised Article 9 nor former Article
9 as enacted by each of the fifty states defines the term "breach of the
peace." Official Comment 2 to Revised Section 9-609 states that "[]ike
former Section 9-503, this section does not define or explain the conduct
that will constitute a breach of the peace, leaving that matter for
continuing development by the courts."3 3 Indeed, the courts in each
state took up the challenge to "define or explain the conduct that will
constitute a breach of the peace," 34 but with decidedly non-uniform, if
not at times conflicting, results.35
Given the lack of a definition of the term "breach of the peace" and
dearth of clear case law guidelines, an obvious solution for secured
parties was to define in their security agreements what acts or conduct
would not be considered a breach of the peace. Former Article 9 on its
30. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999) (emphasis added).
31. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995).
32. U.C.C. § 9- 6 09(a) (1999). For example, Louisiana's Article 9 prohibits secured party
repossessions altogether. Colorado's section 9-601(h) reads: "(h) For purposes of this part 6, in
taking possession of collateral by self-help, "breach of the peace" includes, but is not limited to,
engaging in the following actions without the contemporaneous permission of the dchtor: (1)
Entering a locked or unlocked residence or residential garage; (2) Breaking, opening, or moving any
lock, gate, or other barrier to enter enclosed real property; or (3) Using or threatening to use violent
means." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-601(h).
33. U.C.C. § 9-609, Official Comment 2 (1999).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in
Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549 (1997); Timothy R. Zinnecker, The Default Provisions of
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 54 Bus. LAW. 1113, 1140-46 (1999). See
infra notes 215-17, and accompanying text.
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face did not prohibit exculpatory repossession clauses like the Wombles
clause. 36 Thus, courts too were charged with policing the effectiveness of
such clauses. Where a secured party uses such a clause to justify breaking
into the debtor's residence without her contemporaneous consent,
essentially no court under former Article 9 would enforce the exculpatory
clause for a variety of public policy reasons, including the heightened
privacy expectations in a home and the notion that a home is one's
castle.37 In contrast, there was no such uniformity with respect to the use
of Wombles-like clauses in Wombles-like circumstances, in particular where
the secured party entered the debtor's commercial premises when the
debtor was not present.38 Most notably, in New York a trilogy of cases
decided under former Article 9, of which Wombles is the most recent,
emerged as the primary, jurisdictional example of case law doctrine that
was very tolerant of Wombles-like clauses in Wombles-like circumstances.
In chronological order, Part I, Section C. provides a brief description of
each New York case, followed by evidence that for each case, some
commentators believe that the respective court relied at least partially on
the repossession clause to find no breach of peace had occurred.
C. THE NEW YORK TRILOGY
1. Cherno v. Bank of Babylon 39
In Cherno, the non-consumer debtor leased what appears to have
been commercial building space from a landlord. 40 The debtor entered
into a security agreement with the bank, which in relevant part
36. See infra note 119, and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Gerald L. Blanchard, James R. Marietta, and Rufus T. Dorsey IV, 2 Problem Loan
Workouts § 15:20 (Problem Loan Workouts Database updated August 2011) (stating that "Consent
clauses have unclear effects if repossession occurs when the debtor is not present
. ... " Arguably, the clauses are unenforceable in consumer loans and clearly cannot be used to
justify unauthorized entry into a debtor's home. The consumer's residence holds substantial privacy
protection. Furthermore, most consumer contracts are not actually negotiated and, at most,
consent to entry exists only as an artificial concept and thus provides no reliable basis for action by
the creditor.). See also supra notes 24-28, and accompanying text, and see infra notes 115, 203, and
accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 24-28, and accompanying text, and see infra notes 203-06, 213-15 and
accompanying text.
39. Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114,117 (1967).
40. Id. The debtor was Elwood Auto Parts, Inc., and thus presumably the debtor was not a
consumer, and the premises entered was a commercial building rather than a residence.
Vol. 10:2280
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gave the bank the right in the event of default "(a) to
declare the Note and all Obligations due and payable ...
without notice or demand; (b) to enter the . . . premises ...
where any of the Collateral may be located and take and
carry away the same . . .with or without legal process." 41
After the debtor defaulted on its loan, the bank's employees
repossessed the debtor's assets that were located in the commercial
building space. To enter the premises, the bank employees used a key
they had obtained from a locksmith (as opposed to the debtor, the
landlord, a third-party assignee representing creditors of the debtor, or
the auctioneer hired by the third-party assignee to sell the collateral). 42 It
appears the landlord may have been present during all or some of the time
the bank employees were on the premises.43 But it is not clear whether
the landlord objected to the bank's employees' presence at the time of
entry or even during the repossession. Instead of the auctioneer under the
third-party assignee's control, the bank sold the repossessed collateral.44
The third-party assignee sued the bank for conversion of the
repossessed assets. In order to address the conversion claim, the court
said it first needed to determine if the "the unauthorized entry by the
bank's employees constituted a breach of the peace"45 ; a finding of no
breach of the peace would mean no conversion.
The court held that there was no breach of the peace. 46 Said the
court:
The classic definition of breach of the peace is 'a
disturbance of public order by an act of violence, or by
an act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing
consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of
the community'. . . . Thus, when in the course of
repossession, the conditional vendee received a black
eye, it was a question for the jury whether a breach of
the peace had occurred, People v. Halliday, supra, and
when padlocks on a building are broken there is such
41. Cherno, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
42. Id. at 116-17.
43. Id. at 120 (stating that "Nor was the use of a key to open the door an act likely to produce
violence; indeed, it produced from the landlord only (1) a call for the police and (2) a request to the
bank employees that they leave the key when they were through.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 117-18.
46. Id. at 119.
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force and violence as to constitute a violation of Penal
Law .. . and, presumably, a breach of the peace. 47
Despite these cantations, the Cherno court thought well of the bank
employees' repossession conduct.
Here, however, the bank's employees entered by use of a
key, unauthorizedly obtained. Such an entry, the
assignor's consent aside, would constitute a breaking, but
it is at least questionable whether in view of the consent to
entry set forth in the security agreement (and to which the
assignee took subject) the acts of the bank's employees could
be held to be a breaking. . . . But, breaking or not, there
was nothing in what they did that disturbed public order
by any act of violence, caused consternation or alarm, or
disturbed the peace and quiet of the community. Nor was
the use of a key to open the door an act likely to produce
violence; indeed, it produced from the landlord only (1) a
call for the police and (2) a request to the bank employees
that they leave the key when they were through. Under
the circumstances that existed during the times the
bank's employees entered the premises, there was as a
matter of law no breach of the peace . . . .48
Elsewhere, the court again indicated that the security agreement
influenced its decision: "All that is presently decided is that if the
security agreement is valid the bank's conduct did not constitute a
conversion . . . ."49
Focusing on the court's reliance on the repossession clause, one can
find support for the assertion that the Cherno court construed the
repossession clause's right to enter the debtor's premises term implicitly
to include permission to do so with an unauthorized key, and that such
unauthorized entry would otherwise have been a breach of the peace.50
47. Id. at 119-20.
48. Cherno, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Eugene Mikolajczyk, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A
Modern Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REC. 351, 375 (1977) (asserting that
Cherno is an example of a former Article 9 case where the court "relied partially upon contractual
provisions that disclaimed liability for such actions to find no breach of the peace when it would
have otherwise existed."). One might, however, argue that while the Cherno court referenced the
right to enter the premises clause, the court in fact did not rely on the clause in finding no breach of
peace. Consider that the Cherno court referred to the clause for the question of whether using the
282 Vol. 10:2
THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF REVISED ARTICLE 9
2. Global Casting Industries, Inc. v. Daley Hodkin Corp.5 1
In Global Casting, the non-consumer debtor Global Casting
Industries, Inc. entered into a security agreement with Chemical Bank.
The security agreement in relevant part stated that:
[A] bank shall have the rights and remedies of a secured
party when a debtor is in default under a security
agreement as provided under the Uniform Commercial
Code, and it shall be then lawful for, and Debtor hereby
authorizes and empowers Bank, with the aid and
assistance of any person, to enter upon the premises, or
such other place as the goods may be found and take
possession and carry away the goods without process of
law ... . 52
The debtor defaulted, and the bank's agent "went to the plaintiffs
[debtor's] place of business and, finding the exterior gates locked,
obtained the services of a locksmith who enabled him to gain entry onto
the premises, whereupon he changed the locks on the doors."5 3 Upon
gaining entry, the bank's agent repossessed the collateral, including
inventory and equipment. 54 The debtor's premises was a commercial
structure;5 5 the court did not say whether the debtor owned or leased the
premises. The court's opinion did not indicate whether the debtor or a
third party was present when the bank's agent entered the premises.
The debtor argued that the bank's agent had
unauthorized key was a breaking or not. "Such an entry, the assignor's consent aside, would
constitute a breaking, but it is at least questionable whether in view of the consent to entry set
forth in the security agreement (and to which the assignee took subject) the acts of the bank's
employees could be held to be a breaking." Cherno, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120. But the Cherno court then
said, "But, breaking or not, there was nothing in what they did that disturbed public order by any
act of violence, caused consternation or alarm, or disturbed the peace and quiet of the community,"
and it went on to conclude that there was no breach of peace. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if
the repossession clause was ignored, in which case presumably there would have been a higher
likelihood of the court finding a breaking, that breaking would not have amounted to a breach of
the peace given the absence of violence or public disturbance. Thus, arguably the Cherno court did
not need to rely on, and in fact subtextually may not have relied on, the Cherno clause to exculpate
any breach of peace liability since there was no breach of peace given the absence of violence or
public disturbance. See infra notes 218-25, and accompanying text.
51. Global Casting Industries, Inc. v. Daley Hodkin Corp., 105 Misc.2d 517, 432 N.Y.S.2d 453,
31 UCC Rep. Serv. 377 (1980).
52. Id. at 518-19.
53. Id. at 518.
54. Id. at 518-19.
55. Id. at 518.
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obtained admittance by forceable entrance. However,
[the debtor] admits that the locks were changed.
Plaintiff [debtor] asserts that it advised defendant [bank
agent] "that a lot of merchandise was missing", and that
it was refused access to telephone calls . . . that
defendant's employees answered the phones and
"advised whoever was calling that the plaintiff was out
of business and that its merchandise was being put up
for auction". . .' [and that] the net result of the actions
of the defendant was a total disruption and destruction
of plaintiffs business.5 6
The "plaintiff [debtor] charge[d] that neither Chemical
Bank nor defendant [agent] had 'the right to break into the
premises . . . by means of force . . .' and once in, the defendant's
words on the telephone advising persons that the plaintiff 'was
out of business' are actionable."57 The bank's agent responded
that the debtor "by its execution of the security agreement,
consented to the intrusion of plaintiffs [debtor's] premises and the
taking possession of the chattels contained therein."5 8 The bank's
agent brought a motion for summary judgment, the basis for
which the court observed was "that the written consent of the
plaintiff [debtor], in the security agreement, validates
defendant's [agent's] actions in repossessing plaintiffs assets on
behalf of the Chemical Bank." 59
Citing former Section 9-503, the court said:
While there is no requirement that an express right to
immediate possession of the collateral appears in the
default provisions of the contract since such right
emanates as a matter of statutory law (UCC 9-503) to
the secured party upon the occurrence of a default by
the debtor. . . . here, Chemical Bank, through its agent,
the defendant herein, became entitled to immediate
possession of the collateral both by virtue of the express
provisions of the security agreement and the provisions of
UCC 9-503.60
56. Global Casting Industries, 105 Misc. 2d at 518-19.
57. Id. at 519.
58. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
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Further, the court stated that "by both contract and statute,
petitioner has established its right to take possession of the collateral,
without judicial process, and it did so," 61 and that "[t]his right to take
possession of the collateral by a secured party on debtor's default may
even be enforced against a third party in possession. "62
The court then stated that:
In this case, the validity of the security agreement and
the default of plaintiff are uncontroverted. Also, the
description of the method by which defendant gained
access to the property is not disputed by the plaintiff.
The only issue before the Court, therefore, is whether the
means used by defendant to obtain possession without
judicial process constituted a 'breach of the peace'
within the provisions of UCC 9-503.63
Citing Cherno as "the leading case," the court held that:
The defendant, acting under a valid security agreement
consenting to entry and possession of the plaintiffs assets,
and pursuant to the express provisions of UCC 9-503,
entered the plaintiff's premises by use of a key
unauthorizedly obtained. Such an entry, even if the
chains were cut, under the circumstances of this case,
does not, as a matter of law, constitute a breach of the
peace. 64
While the Global Casting court did not articulate a definition of
breach of the peace, it quoted favorably Cherno's definition of breach of
peace and the court's no breach of peace analysis:
a disturbance of public order by an act of violence, or by
an act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing
consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of
the community . . . there was nothing in what they did
that disturbed public order by any act of violence,
caused consternation or alarm, or disturbed the peace
and quiet of the community. Nor was the use of a key to
open the door an act likely to produce violence ... .65
Unlike Cherno, there was no evidence in the Global Casting court's
61. Id. at 520.
62. Id.
63. Global Casting Industries, 105 Misc. 2d at 520.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id.
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opinion that the debtor or a third party was present when the bank's
agent entered the commercial building and repossessed the collateral.
On this metric, the possibility of violence was lower in Global Casting
than in Cherno.
As with Cherno, one can find support in the literature that the
Global Casting court's no breach of peace holding relied in part on the
consent to enter and take possession term in the repossession clause. As
Professor Lawrence observed about Global Casting:
The fact that the creditor's agent entered the premises
with the aid of a locksmith in order to repossess the
collateral does not constitute a breach of the peace so as
to make the repossession improper where the security
agreement gave the right to enter the premises 'with the
aid and assistance of any person.66
3. Wombles Charters, Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc.67
In Wombles, the secured party repossessed a bus located on the
debtor's "private property." 68 While not entirely clear from the case,
the debtor (Wombles Charters, Inc.) was a business debtor, not a
consumer debtor, and the bus was the debtor's business equipment. 69
The debtor claimed that the secured party had cut a lock to enter the
66. See LARY LAWRENCE, 10 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503:186
(3d. ed. 2012) [hereinafter 10 ANDERSON U.C.C.]. Alternatively, one can argue that while the
Global Casting court referenced the right to enter the premises clause, the court did not need to rely
on, and in fact subtextually may not have relied on, the clause in finding no breach of peace. There
are two reasons for this argument. The first reason is identical to the argument made above with
respect to Cherno, supra note 50, which Global Casting cited in its opinion for the proposition that
under the circumstances of the repossession there was no breach of peace because there was no
likelihood of violence or public disturbance, even where the secured party had used an unauthorized
key or cut chains. The second reason is that the Global Casting court explicitly says that "[w]hilc
there is no requirement that an express right to immediate possession of the collateral appears in
the default provisions of the contract since such right emanates as a matter of statutory law (UCC9-
503) to the secured party upon the occurrence of a default by the debtor . . . [the secured party]
became entitled to immediate possession of the collateral both by virtue of the express provisions of
the security agreement and the provisions of UCC 9-503." (emphasis added). Id. at 455. Given the
court's assertion that the right to immediate possession emanates from Section 9-503 (Revised
Section 9-609), so too it could have found that the derivative right (privilege) to enter the premises
arises from the statute and not just the contract provision. See supra note 21. In other words, one
could argue, the Global Casting court did not need to rely on the exculpatory clause (and in fact
subtextually may not have relied on it), in finding that no breach of peace occurred under the
circumstances of the repossession. See infra notes 215-25, and accompanying text.
67. Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 599.
68. Id. at 600.
69. Id.
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property, which the secured party denied.70 Also, while the court's
opinion says the bus was located on the debtor's "private property," it
does not describe the nature of the debtor's interest in the property (e.g.,
owner or lessee), nor whether the property entered was merely land
surrounded by a locked fence or chain, and/or a nonresidential structure
like a commercial garage. However, nothing suggests the bus was on
residential premises including, for example, a home garage or carport.
Finally, the court's opinion does not indicate the debtor or any other
third party was present when the secured party entered the premises
and repossessed the bus.
Among other things, the debtor argued that the
repossession was performed improperly (1)
because the repossession was done by trespassing onto
property well-marked with 'No Trespassing' signs . . .
[and (2)] because the repossession was performed by
breaking into private property, it constitutes a breach of
the peace" under former Section 9-503.7' The court
found that "None of these arguments present a question
of material fact, and summary judgment on these issues
is appropriate.7 2
As to the trespassing issue, the court said that:
The Security Agreement, stated that "[i]t shall be lawful
for [Credit Alliance] to take possession of the Mortgaged
Property, at any time wherever it may be and to enter
any premises . . . without liability for trespass . . . .
"Even if there was a 'No Trespassing' sign on the
property-which defendant disputes-the contract
authorized Defendant to enter the private property in
order to repossess the bus."73
As to the breach of peace issue, the court stated that former Section
9-503 permits a creditor to repossess collateral without judicial action as
long as it can be done without a breach of the peace. The term "breach
of the peace" was defined in People v. Most, as a "disturbance of public
order by an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence, or which,
by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the
70. Id. at 602.
71. Global Casting Industries, 105 Misc. 2d at 601.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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community." Plaintiffs claim that Defendant breached the peace
because they cut a lock, which Defendant denies. In Cherno v. Bank of
Babylon, the court observed that even though using an illegal key to
enter property to repossess collateral could be considered breaking and
entering, there was nothing in that act that disturbed public order by
any act of violence, caused consternation or alarm, or disturbed the
peace and quiet of the community. Nor was the use of a key to open the
door an act likely to produce violence under the circumstances that
existed at the time] there was as a matter of law no breach of the peace.
In Global Casting Ind. Inc. v. Daley-Hodkin Corp., under a similar set of
facts, the court held that "such an entry, even if the chains were cut
does not, as a matter of law, constitute a breach of the peace." Thus,
even accepting Plaintiffs' allegations, there was no breach of the peace
in this case. 74
While the Wombles court did not mention the repossession clause
when discussing the breach of peace issue, the court does cite with
approval both Cherno and Global Casting. As with Cherno and Global
Casting, a number of commentators find that Wombles' enter the
premises clause played a role in the court's no breach of peace holding.75
The New York trilogy and several like cases7 6 appear to be in the
minority of courts that under former Article 9 condoned clauses
exculpating forceful entries in similar Wombles-like circumstances. 77
Even if this minority status is empirically accurate, in 2014 it is not
difficult to find repossession clauses both similar and dissimilar to the
Wombles clause not only in cases decided under former and Revised
74. Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 602-03 (internal citations omitted).
75. 10 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 66, at § 9-503:183 (stating about Wombles that "Where
security agreement allowed secured party to enter any premises without liability for trespass, there
was no breach of peace even though the premises entered had a 'No trespassing' sign on the
property and the secured party cut a lock."); Samuel J. M. Donnelly and Mary Ann Donnelly,
1999-2000 Survey of New York Law, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 279, 344 (2001) (stating that "In
Wombles the plaintiffs argued that the repossession of a bus violated N.Y. UCC § 9-503 because
during that self-help repossession there was a trespass on plaintiff's property despite "No
Trespassing" signs and because defendants cut a lock to enter plaintiff's property. The Southern
District held these actions did not violate N.Y. UCC § 9-503 because the security agreement
authorized the creditor to enter the debtor's premises "without liability for trespass."). See also
infra, notes 189-90, and accompanying text. But see infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
76. See Komar Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Hine, & Flory, LLP, 60 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 929
(Ohio C.P. 2005); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
See generally Emmons v. Burkett, 179 Ga. App. 838, 348 S.E.2d 323 (1986), rev'd on other grounds
256 Ga. 855, 353 S.E. 2d 908, on remand 183 Ga. App. 654, 359 S.E. 2d 691.").
77. A. Craig Cleland, Wrongful Repossessions in Georgia, 8 Ga. St. U. L. REV. 223 (1992)
(student note) (stating that "While New York courts also sanction a secured creditor's unauthorized
entry into a debtor's business premises, the holding in Emmons represents a minority position.").
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Article 9,78 but also in negotiated documents,79 model form documents,80
and a variety of treatises and other academic or practitioner
publications.8' Thus, courts in both the majority and the minority
jurisdictions will need to be able to determine whether and when a
repossession clause runs afoul of the Revised Article 9's new statutory
prohibition in order to understand, respectively, its over-inclusive and
under-inclusive application.82 Unfortunately, only a few courts have
cited to the Revised Article 9 sections constituting the new statutory
prohibition, and none has squarely addressed its meaning, scope and
application. Compounding this problem, little substantial in-depth
doctrinal or normative analysis of the new statutory provision appears
in the academic and practitioner literatures. Nevertheless, as discussed
infra Part II, a review of this literature reveals a consensus that Revised
Article 9's new statutory prohibition is very robust, thus at first blush
casting doubt upon the continued efficacy of the New York trilogy and
like cases. Part III, however, reveals important, dissenting voices to
this view, thus sowing uncertainty and lack of predictability about the
reach of the Revised Article 9's new statutory prohibition with regard to
a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances.
II. REVISED ARTICLE 9'S NEW STATUTORY PROHIBITION
As discussed supra Part I, above, like former Article 9, Revised
Article does not define "breach of the peace." In contrast, however,
through a two-step process, Revised Article 9 introduced a statutory
limitation on exculpatory breach of peace clauses. New subsection 9-
602(6) was added to Revised Section 9-602, and states that "the debtor
may not waive or vary the rul[e] stated in . . . Section 9-609 to the
extent that it imposes upon a secured party that takes possession of
collateral without judicial process the duty to do so without breach of
78. For former Article 9 cases, see, e.g., Riley State Bank of Riley v. Spillman, 242 Kan. 696,
750 P.2d 1024, 6 UCC Rep. Serv.2d 990, (Kan. 1988). For Revised Article 9 cases, see, e.g., In re
Bolin & Co., LLC 437 B.R. 731, 766 (D. Conn. 2010).
79. See, e.g., REALDEALDOCs, http://realdealdocs.com/ (a website providing copies of
negotiated security agreements containing a variety of remedy clauses).
80. See, e.g., PETER A. ALCES ET AL., 4 UCC THANs GD § 34:19-45 (2013).
81. See, e.g., 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-609:16; ROBEirT A. FELDMAN &
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DHAl'TING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: A PiRACTITIONER's GUIDE, DECPC
FORM 11-1 TO 11-4 (through 2012 Supp.) [hereinafter DECPG].
82. For an example of overinclisive application, see infra note 225 and accompanying text.
For an underinclusive application example, see infra note 266 and accompanying text.
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the peace."8 3 Section 9-602's constraint on the parties' freedom of
contract is loosened under Section 9-603(a), which states that "[t]he
parties may determine by agreement the standards measuring the
fulfillment of the rights of a debtor or obligor and the duties of a secured
party under a rule stated in Section 9-602 if the standards are not
manifestly unreasonable."8 4 However, new Section 9-603(b) states that
"[slubection (a) does not apply to the duty under 9-609 to refrain from
breaching the peace."85 Thus, together, new Revised subsection 9-602(6)
and Revised Section 9-603(b) prohibit the secured party and debtor by
agreement from 1) waiving or varying the secured party's duty to take
possession of the collateral without breach of the peace, and 2) setting
standards measuring the fulfillment of the secured party's duty to
refrain from breaching the peace, even if those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
Commentators generally characterize the new statutory prohibition
as a very robust constraint on the parties' freedom of contract with
respect to the duty not to breach the peace. For example, Professors
Rusch and Sepinuck state flatly that "[n]othing in the security
agreement can relieve the secured party of its obligation to avoid a
breach of the peace. §§ 9-602, 9-603."86 Moving from "nothing" to a
slightly less robust characterization, Professor Lawrence says that
[t]here is little that a secured party can do in the drafting
of a security agreement to prevent a court from finding
that its means of repossessing collateral resulted in a
breach of the peace. Not only may a debtor not waive the
secured party's duty to repossess collateral without a
breach of the peace, but the secured party and debtor
may not, by their agreement, set the standards for
determining whether a breach of the peace has occurred.87
And Barkley Clark opines that under Section 9-603(b), "the term
'breach of the peace' cannot be tinkered with in the security
agreement."8 8
83. U.C.C. § 9-602(6) (1999).
84. Id. at § 9-603(a) (1999).
85. U.C.C. § 9-603 (1999).
86. LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON SECURED TRANSACrIONS 115 (Thomson/West 2d ed. 2010) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter RUSCII & SEPINUCK, TEACHER'S MANUAL].
87. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-609:16 (emphasis added).
88. Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope Perfection, Priorities and Default, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 129, (Apr. 2000) (emphasis added). See also JUDY L. WOODS, 8A IND. PRAC., UCC
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Complimenting the view of the new statutory prohibition as a very
robust constraint on the parties' freedom of contract, some
commentators frame this robustness as a near total deference to the
courts in determining whether a breach of a peace has occurred.
Generally, this argument runs that only courts (or juries) may determine
as a matter of law (or fact) whether the secured party committed breach
of the peace, and such determination must be made through application
of the relevant law to the facts of the case, and not through the parties'
repossession clause to the extent it creates a waiver, variance, or a
standard measuring fulfillment of the no breach of peace duty.89 For
example, Miller and Cohen state that
[w]hile revised Section 9-603(a) [Rev] generally allows
the parties to determine by agreement the standards
measuring fulfillment of the rights and duties that are
not waivable pursuant to revised Section 9-602 [Rev],
revised Section 9-603(b) [Rev] contains an important
exception to that rule. Subsection (b) provides that the
ability to determine standards by agreement does not
apply to the secured party's duty under revised Section
9-609 [Rev] to refrain from breaching the peace. Thus,
fulfillment of that duty (which is applicable both to self-
help repossession of collateral and to self-help rendering
of equipment collateral unusable) will be determined by
the court through standards derived from the statute
itself without regard to any agreement that the parties may
have reached before or after default. 90
With slightly less conviction, Professors Barron and Wessman say
that Section 9-603(b)
excepts the duty to refrain from breach of the peace
from more the general rule that the parties may by
contract define that standards for measuring the secured
party's fulfillment of his duties. It would seem to follow
FORMS ANNOTATEi) 26-1-9.1-603 (Current through the 2010-2011 Pocket Part) (stating that "The
parties may not abrogate the duty under § 9.1-609 not to breach the peace.").
89. Indeed, Official Comment 3 to Section 9-609 states in relevant part that "[1]ike former
Section 9-503, this section does not define or explain the conduct that will constitute a breach of the
peace, leaving that matter for continuing development by the courts." Section 9-609, Official
Comment 3 (2001).
90. FREDERICK IH. MILLER & NEit B. COHEN, 9C HAWKLAND UCC SEHIES § 9-603:2
(Database updated Sept. 2013) (emphasis added).
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that only the courts may define what constitutes a
breach of peace, and that conduct that is otherwise a
breach of the peace cannot be cleansed by the debtor's
advance consent to it in the security agreement.9'
Other commentators argue for similar strong deference to the
courts rather than the parties' contract in determining whether a breach
of the peace occurred. 92
Given these pronouncements, the Revised Article 9's new statutory
prohibition would appear to leave no room for the secured party's use of
clauses like those in the New York trilogy and like cases under
repossession circumstances similar to those cases. As discussed above, of
each of Cherno, Global Casting, and Wombles Charters, commentators
have said that the court at least partially relied on the exculpatory
clause to find no breach of peace had occurred due to the offending
conduct (lock picking, and lock cutting, respectively). Thus, it would
seem clear that the New York trilogy and like cases would no longer be
good law under the new statutory prohibition for the argument that a
Wombles-like exculpatory clause would be valid in Wombles-like
repossession circumstances.
Despite this impression, a review of the academic and practitioner
literatures reveals apparent dissenting voices about the demise of
Wombles-like clauses in Wombles-like circumstances. Part III, infra,
discusses these apparent dissenting voices, framing them as examples of
conflict and uncertainty in certain circumstances about the new
statutory prohibition's scope.
91. PAUL BARRON & MARK B. WESSMAN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO SECUREi) TRANSACTIONS
172 (2004).
92. See, e.g., Michael W. Dunagan, Vehicle Repossessions and Resales under Revised UCC Article
9: The Requirements and the Consequences of Non-Compliance, 54 CONSUM ER FIN. L.Q. REP. 192, 197
(2000) (stating that "Revised section 9-602(6) specifically prohibits an attempt to agree in the
contract what is or is not a breach of the peace, leaving the courts to define the limits of the actions
a creditor can take."); Jeffrey Jackson and Mary Miller, 7A MS Prac. Encyclopedia MS Law §
66:169 (Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law Current through 2011-2012 update) (stating that "The
parties may not, by agreement, establish standards of conduct for determining whether the secured
party has complied with its duty to refrain from breaching the peace. Therefore, the question of
whether conduct involved in self-help repossession of collateral constitutes a breach of the peace is a
factual determination left to the courts in each case."); Zinnecker, supra note 35, at 1123 (stating
that Revised section 9-603 "expressly prohibits parties from attempting to agree on what actions by
a creditor, engaged in self-help repossession, will not breach the peace"); WITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 23, at § 34-8, page 384 (5th ed. 2002) (stating that "The courts generally have reached sound
conclusions in defining 'breach of the peace.' . . . For the most part, courts ignore clauses
purporting to authorize a repossession which results in a breach of the peace . . .").
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III. A BATTLE OF TITANS, AND OTHER EXAMPLES OF
CONFLICT AND UNCERTAINLY APPLYING THE
SECTION 9-603 STRAND OF REVISED ARTICLE 9'S NEW
STATUTORY PROHIBITION
A review of the cases and commentary on the Revised Article 9's
new statutory prohibition reveals dissenting voices to the apparent
consensus of a very robust prohibition on exculpatory breach of peace
clauses. This review also suggests that the major source of disagreement
and uncertainty about the prohibition's scope springs from what the
Article calls the Section 9-603 strand. As discussed in Part I, Revised
Section 9-603(a) states that "[t]he parties may determine by agreement
the standards measuring the fulfillment of the rights of a debtor or
obligor and the duties of a secured party under a rule stated in Section 9-
602 if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable."93 New Section 9-
603(b) states that "[s]ubection (a) does not apply to the duty under 9-
609 to refrain from breaching the peace." 94 Thus, under the Section 9-
603 strand, if a repossession clause is (1) an agreement by the parties, (2)
determining the standards measuring the fulfillment of (3) the secured
party's duty to refrain from breaching the peace, then the clause runs
afoul of the new statutory prohibition.95 Said Thomas Quinn of the
Section 9-603 strand: "[t]he precise content of this prohibition is not
clear. The revisers say only that 'the parties are not permitted to set
standards measuring fulfillment of the secured party's duty to take
collateral without breaching the peace'. . ."96 Perhaps then Mr. Quinn
would not be surprised to see the following examples of conflict and
uncertainty emerge from the Section 9-603 strand.
93. U.C.C. § 9-603(a) (1999).
94. U.C.C. § 9-603(b) (1999).
95. The Article puts aside Revised 9-60 2's prohibition on waivers or variances with respect to
the duty not to breach the peace. The scope of this strand of the new statutory prohibition likely is
narrower and thus will obtain to fewer breach of peace clauses. Instead, because the prohibition
against the parties determining "by agreement the standards measuring the fulfillment of' the
secured party's "duty not to breach the peace" likely is broader in scope and thus more threatening
to clauses like that in Wombles, with few exceptions the Article looks solely at the Section 9-603
strand.
96. TilOMAS M. QUINN, 8 QUINN'S UCC COMMENTARY & LAW DIGESr § 9-603[A][3] [Rev]
(Rev. 2d ed.) (2010).
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A. PROFESSORS WARREN AND WALT VS. PROFESSORS WARREN
AND LOPUCKI: A BATTLE OF TITANS OVER WOMBLES'
CONTINUED EFFICACY.
If in 2014 a case identical to Wombles was litigated in New York
under New York law, and the secured party attempted to rely on its
Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances to argue that it had
not breached the peace, under Revised Article 9 would the 2014 Wombles
court (like the 1990 Wombles court) be able to rely partially on the
exculpatory clause to find no breach of peace had occurred? Professors
Warren and Walt suggest that the 2104 Wombles court could not, while
Professors Warren and Lopucki seem to say it could, at least under
certain circumstances.
In their 2011 textbook SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY, Professors Warren and Walt pose a problem whose facts are
based closely on Wombles', and which substantively sets forth the same
repossession clause as in Wombles.97 They ask whether the secured
party's conduct amounts to a breach of the peace, and advise students
to look to Section 9-602(6) and Section 9-603(b).9 8 They say that
[t]he court in Wombles said that there was no threat of
violence and no breach of the peace. It gave weight to
the exculpatory clause. This would be difficult to do
under 9-602(6) and 9-603(b). The case should be used to
introduce 9-603(a), which is the basis for arguing that a
clause is not a waiver but merely sets standards that are
not manifestly unreasonable." 99
Contrast Professors Warren and Walts' position with that of
Professors Warren and Lopucki. In their 2012 textbook Secured Credit,
A Systems Approach, they discuss revised Section 9-609 and what
constitutes breach of the peace. 00  While doing so, they very briefly
summarize a number of breach of peace cases, including Wombles.
The collateral was a bus located in the debtor's business
premises. The repossessor cut a lock to enter the
property marked "No Trespassing" to get the bus. The
court held that this repossession was not a breach of the
97. WARREN & WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 7, at 269.
98. Id.
99. WARHEN & WALT, TEACH Ei's MANUAL, supra note 8, at 112 (emphasis added).
100. WARREN & LOPUCKI, SECURED CREDIT, supra note 9, at 43-54.
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peace because the security agreement signed by the
debtor permitted the creditor to "enter any premises
without liability for trespass."i 0
They also set forth a breach of peace problem with varying
circumstances and questions. In part 3.2.d of the problem, Professors
Warren and Lopucki pose the scenario of a secured party wanting to
repossess a bulldozer where the debtor keeps it "in a locked, steel
building on the debtor's own property."10 2 They state in part that "If
our security agreement has a provision in it authorizing us to pick the
lock-or even cut it-Wombles Charters v. Orix Credit Alliance . . . is
authority for doing it. Of course, if there is a confrontation, we will have
to withdraw . . . .*"0 Notably, Professors Warren and Lopucki cite
Wombles as supporting authority. The emphasized language suggests
that Professors Warren and Lopucki believe that Wombles remains good
law (it "is authority"; present tense) for the proposition that that under
Revised Article 9 a secured party permissibly may use a Wombles-like
clause in Wombles-like circumstances.
In part 3. 2 .e of the problem, Warren and Lopucki ask whether
there is anything that should be in the secured party's security
agreement about repossession that might make the secured party's job
easier." 04 They state in relevant part that:
Nothing in the security agreement can relieve the
secured party of its obligation to avoid a breach of the
peace through confrontation. The debtor cannot waive
the §9-609 "breach of the peace" limitation. U.C.C. §9-
602(6). But Wombles Charters . . . is one of several cases
that give effect to provisions in the security agreement
that consents to entry to land or buildings to effect a
repossession when the debtor is not present. 0 5
Again, the professors seem to suggest Wombles remains good law
under Revised Article 9 ("But Wombles Charters . . . give[s] effect;"
present tense) for the proposition that that a secured party permissibly
may use a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances.
Thus, two sets of well-regarded academics appear to have starkly
different views about whether and when a Wombles-like clause in
101. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 54.
103. WARREN & LOPUCKI, TEACHER's MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38 (emphasis added).
104. WAREN & LOPUCKI, SECURED CB EDIT, supra note 9, at 54.
105. WARREN & LOPUCKi, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38.
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Wombles-like circumstances would survive judicial scrutiny under
Revised Article 9. Why? Unfortunately, neither set provides in their
respective textbooks or accompanying Teacher's Manuals sufficient
application of the new statutory prohibition to be sure of the answer to
that question.
B. THE LAWRENCE CLAUSE VS. THE UCC TRANSACTIONS GUIDE
CLAUSE
Lest one think Professors Warren and Lopucki are lone outliers
from the apparent consensus that the Section 9-603 strand is very
robust, another stark example of seemingly different views on whether
and when the new statutory prohibition bans exculpatory breach of
peace clauses is illustrated in the two following repossession clauses. The
first is based upon a discussion by well-regarded Professor Lawrence
with respect to the Section 9-603 strand (the "Lawrence clause"). 0 6 The
second clause is from the UCC Transactions Guide, edited by a number
of other well-regarded commercial law academics and practitioners (the
"UTG clause"). 07
The Lawrence clause reads as follows: "Upon the debtor's default
under the security agreement, the debtor consents to the secured party
entering into the debtor's premises to repossess the collateral at any time
that the debtor is not present, whether or not the premises are
locked." 08
The UTG clause reads as follows:
In the event of a Default, the Lender shall have the right
to enter upon the premises of the Borrower where the
Collateral is located. . . . Borrower expressly agrees that
Lender may, if necessary to gain occupancy to the
premises where the Equipment and Farm Products are
located, without further notice to Borrower (i) hire
Borrower's employees to assist in the loading and
transportation of such Collateral, (ii) utilize Borrower's
Equipment in such operation, (iii) cut or otherwise
temporarily move or remove any barbed wire or other
106. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-603:4.
107. ALCEs, HANSFORD ET AL., supra note 80, at § 34:45.
108. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-603:4.
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fencing or similar boundary-maintenance devices, and
(iv) pick or otherwise render inoperative any locks on
gates to barns, pastures or other property not
customarily habitated by people; Borrower agrees that
any such actions authorized by this sentence shall be
deemed to have been authorized and not a breach of the
peace if the Lender takes reasonable efforts to safeguard
all of the Borrower's property (e.g. by restringing any
barbed wire fences). 09
Professor Lawrence believes the Lawrence clause is prohibited
under the Section 9-603 strand. Says he:
This limitation is absolutely necessary. The basic
standard that courts have established for determining
whether the secured party has breached the peace is
whether there was an intentional disruption of the peace,
an act of violence or a threat likely to cause violence. To
allow the parties to set the standards for determining
what constitutes a breach of the peace would allow too
much possibility for abuse. This is especially true since
many security agreements are contracts of adhesion.
This freedom to agree upon the standards would have
otherwise permitted, for example . . . [the Lawrence
clause]. Any such contractual provision would have too
great a tendency to lead to a violent confrontation. 0
In contrast, while the UTG clause author and editors do not
explicitly claim the clause would pass muster under the new statutory
prohibition, let alone the Section 9-603 strand, presumably they must
think it does since they currently recommend the clause in their treatise
as a model clause to be used in an agricultural financing security
agreement. I
Notice that both clauses explicitly authorize the secured party to
enter the debtor's "premises" when the debtor is absent. Both clauses
also authorize the secured party to break locks to affect this entry. How
then does one square the two conflicting conclusions about each clause's
validity under the Section 9-603 strand? How, for example, do the UTG
clause author and editors justify their language that entry onto the
109. ALCEs, IIANSFOHD ET AL., supra note 80, at § 34:45.
110. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-603:4.
111. ALCES, IIANSFORD ET AL., supra note 80, at § 34:45.
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premises and the listed forceful acts such as lock picking and barbed wire
cutting "shall be deemed to have been authorized and not a breach of the
peace if the Lender takes reasonable efforts to safeguard all of the Borrower's
property (e.g. by restringing any barbed wire fences)?""l2 Doctrinally, why
is this not a standard measuring the fulfillment of the secured party's
duty to refrain from breaching the peace, and thus prohibited under the
Section 9-603 strand? They do not say.
C. MISCELLANEOUS
There are other, less poignant, examples of commentary that
seemingly tilt against the consensus that the new statutory prohibition
is very robust. For example, one can find commentators who cite to
Global Casting in discussions about Revised Article 9's repossession rules,
thus suggesting that it remains good breach of peace law under the new
statutory prohibition." 3 In other instances, there is commentary on the
Revised Article 9's repossession rules that mentions Wombles, but with
no discussion of the effect thereon from Revised Article 9's new
statutory prohibition.114 And then there is commentary on the new
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. For example, Blanchard, Marietta, and Dorsey say that "The consent [to enter] clauses are
more likely to be enforceable in commercial agreements and on business premises . . . . The cases
indicate generally that the clause is effective, but the degree to which this provides reliable
guidance for the creditor should be tempered by the developing tendency of courts to protect
commercial debtors from the literal terms of their own agreements." BLANCHARD, MARIETTA &
DORSEY, supra note 37, at § 15:20. As support for the proposition preceding footnote five, the
authors cite Global Casting, supra note 51, and Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) ("valid entry where permitted by contract and creditor owned
premises leased to the debtor"). Id. See also Alan J. Jacobs, Theresa Leming, Jeffrey J. Shampo,
and the National Legal Research Group, Inc., similarly say that "The concept of breach of the
peace includes threats or violence, . . . and, in the absence of an agreement between the parties to the
contrary, [ni.11] breaking and entering to gain possession of the collateral. There may be a breach of the
peace although there is no violence or physical confrontation, or threat thereof." ALAN J. JACOBS,
ET AL., 86A AM. JUR. 2D SECURElD TRANSACTIONS § 565 (database updated February 2013). In
footnote 11, they also cite Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 873 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974) and Global Casting Industries, Inc. v. Daley-Hodkin Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 517, 432
N.Y.S.2d 453, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Id. By citing Global Casting to
support the assertion that "in the absence of an agreement between the parties to the contrary,
breaking and entering to gain possession of the collateral" is a breach of the peace, the authors seem
to suggest that Global Casting and the other cited cases remain good precedent for exculpatory
breach of peace clauses.
114. Donnelly & Donnelly, supra note 75, at 344. Donnelly and Donnelly observe that Revised
section 9-609 is essentially the same rule as former 9-503. Discussing problems with the breach of
peace standard and self-help repossession under former 9-503, they give a brief description of
Wombles. Yet, they make no mention of 9-603(h) or whether Wombles remains good law
thereunder.
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statutory prohibition that mentions none of the New York trilogy or
other Wombles-like cases." 5 To be sure, these miscellaneous examples
alone do not the case make for conflict and uncertainty about the
Section 9-603 strand's scope. But considered with the two starker
examples, collectively they demand attention and explication of the
possible doctrinal (and normative) rationale's underlying the dissent.
Part IV takes on this task.
IV. APPLYING THE SECTION 9-603 STRAND AND
DERIVATIVE TESTS TO WOMBLES
How to explain these examples of conflict and the resulting
uncertainty about the scope of the Section 9-603 strand? This Parts
initial tack is to conduct a straightforward application of the Section 9-
603 strand's requirements to answer this core question: In 2014 in a New
York court under New York law" 6 could a secured party use a Wombles-
like clause in Wombles-like repossession circumstances ("2014 Wombles
Case") to exculpate forceful conduct like lock cutting employed while
entering the debtor's commercial premises? This Part then applies to
this core question various clause validity tests derived from the statute
but which are not themselves straight statutory applications thereof.
Rather, they are abridged or shorthand methods for determining
whether and when a clause violates the Section 9-603 strand. In so
doing, this Part also identifies possible doctrinal and/or normative
reasons for the professorial titans' apparently different answers to the
core question. Because neither set of professors provides in their
respective textbooks or accompanying teacher's manuals sufficient
application of the Section 9-603 strand to answer the core question, this
115. In discussing Revised Section 9-603, Professor Zinnecker says it "expressly prohibits
parties from attempting to agree on what actions by a creditor, engaged in self-help repossession,
will not breach the peace." H1e also states that "[t]his express prohibition codifies the result reached
in many cases [under former Article 9] where creditors unsuccessfully argued that they did not
breach the peace during repossession because their actions were permitted by provisions in the loan
documents. The prohibition makes sense, as the goal of protecting life and property significantly
outweighs any interest in preserving contractual expectations." ZINNECKER, supra note 35, at
1123. Intriguingly, in the footnote accompanying this last statement, Professor Zinnecker cites
only to cases under former Article 9 where the premises entered was residential, not commercial,
and thus not Wombles-like circumstances. Thus, he cites neither the New York trilogy, nor other
cases with Wombles-like circumstances.
116. If New York law did not apply, but rather, for example, Tennessee law, then perhaps that
would explain the battle of the titans. See Lloyd, supra note 22, at 773-74. But neither set of
professors explicitly says what state's law governs their respective textbook problems.
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Part engages in a bit of guesswork, a dollop of reading between the lines,
and at times outright speculation about why these professors hold their
respective views on whether Wombles remains good law under the
Revised Section 9.
With this in mind, unless specified otherwise, this Part assumes
that Wombles, Global Casting, and Cherno are not good law for the
exculpatory power of Wombles-like repossession clauses in Wombles-like
circumstances. Thus, when evaluating the effectiveness of a Wombles-
like clause under the Section 9-603 strand's statutory requirements and
the derivative tests, the 2014 Wombles court cannot use the New York
trilogy as precedent for that proposition, and instead must look only to
the Revised Article 9, including the Section 9-603 strand, and other
relevant case law. Note that under this constrained analysis, relevant
case law would include the New York trilogy, but only for propositions
other than for the validity of a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like
circumstances." 7
Organizationally, Section A explores the Section 9-603 strand's
requirement that the parties' agreement create standards measuring the
fulfillment of the secured party's duty not to breach the peace. Section
B explores the requirement that the agreement's fulfillment measuring
standards pertain to the secured party's mandatory duty not to breach the
peace. While potentially meaningful, beyond the following footnote, the
Article does not address the requirement that the parties have made an
"agreement." 118 Section C explores the Otherwise BOP test, a shorthand
test proposed by a number of commentators with respect to the Section
9-603 strand that may explain the battle of the professorial titans and
other conflicting views. Section D explores the conundrum of
conflicting clause validity outcomes produced by different analyses/tests
117. For such propositions, see infra note 208, and accompanying text.
118. The Section 9-603 strand's third requirement is that the parties made an "agreement" with
respect to the matters covered in the repossession clause. Section 1-201 defines "agreement" as a
"hargain in fact between the parties . . . ." UCC Section 1-201(2) (2001). Thus, another way a
repossession clause could fail the Section 9-603 strand is if it was not agreed to by the parties.
Rather than argue whether the first two requirements have been met, a debtor could simply argue
that the parties had no agreement with respect to the repossession conduct the secured party is
trying to excuse under the clause. Many types of contract formation or interpretation issues could
arise under this requirement. For example, with consumer debtors, there is the possibility that the
contract is one of adhesion. Another example lies in Wombles, where although the Wombles clause
did not explicitly authorize the secured party to cut the locks, the 1990 Wombles court arguably
construed it to authorize the act. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Yet nowhere in the
opinion does the court inquire whether the parties intended the clause to authorize lock cutting to
affect entry onto the debtor's premises.
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applied from different temporal perspectives (i.e., ex ante vs. ex post),
and which may be another reason for the battle of the professorial titans
and other conflicting views.
A. STANDARDS MEASURING FULFILLMENT
This Section explores the Section 9-603 strand's statutory
requirement that the parties' agreement create standards measuring the
fulfillment of the secured party's duty not to breach the peace. If a
repossession clause does not bear language-creating standards measuring
the fulfillment of that duty, then the clause does not run afoul of the
Section 9-603 strand, even if the clause pertains to the secured party's
duty not to breach the peace. Perhaps a difference of opinion about the
Wombles clause with respect to this requirement explains the battle of
the titans.
1. Arguments that the Wombles Clause Satisfies the "Standards
Measuring the Fulfillment of" Requirement
What arguments might be assembled that the Wombles clause
satisfies the "standards measuring the fulfillment of" requirement?
Revised Article 9 does not provide a statutory definition for the phrase
"standards measuring the fulfillment of." Because under former Article
9 the secured party's duty not to breach the peace was not a mandatory
duty under former Section 9-501, statutorily it was not subject to former
Section 9-501(3)'s permission to craft standards measuring the
fulfillment of that duty.119 Thus, former Article 9 cases do not explicate
the meaning of the phrase with respect to the secured party's duty not
to breach the peace. And unfortunately under Revised Article 9, there
are no cases substantively interpreting or applying the phrase
"standards measuring the fulfillment of" with respect to the secured
party's no breach of peace duty.120 However, guidance as to the phrase's
meaning may be found in former Article 9 and Revised Article 9 cases
considering clauses discussing standards measuring the fulfillment of
other secured party duties such as "commercial reasonableness" and
119. ZINNECKER, supra note 35, at 1123.
120. Only one Revised Article 9 case, In re Bolin, provides guidance about the meaning of the
Section 9-603(b) prohibition, and then only cursorily so in a footnote, stating that the section
prohibits private contracts that "determine whether the prohibition of breaching the peace has
been met." In re Bolin & Co., LLC 437 B.R. 731, 766, at n.15 (D. Conn. 2010).
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"reasonable notification" which, like the duty not to breach the peace,
are mandatory rules protected under Revised Section 9-602 (former
Section 9-501).121
With respect to the commercial reasonableness duty, under former
and Revised Article 9, a secured creditor selling repossessed collateral
must do so in a "commercially reasonable" manner. 12 2 The term
"commercially reasonable" is not defined, although statutory guidance
as to its meaning is provided in Sections 9-610(b) and 9-627.123 Just as
with the secured party's duty not to breach the peace, Section 9-602 in
effect states that the secured party's duty to conduct a "commercially
reasonable" sale is a mandatory duty that cannot be waived or varied.124
However, unlike with the duty not to breach the peace, the secured
party under Section 9-603(a) may in its security agreement craft
"standards measuring the fulfillment of' the commercial reasonableness
duty, so long as those standards are not "manifestly unreasonable." 25
The same rule was true under former Article 9.126 Thus, in both former
and Revised Article 9 cases, one can find examples of secured parties
arguing that their repossession sales were commercially reasonable
because they complied with the standards set forth in their security
agreements. Some of these cases can help in determining whether and
when a clause contains "standards measuring the fulfillment of" of a
Section 9-602 mandatory duty; in the 2014 Wombles case the secured
party's duty not to breach the peace.12 7
A recent commercial reasonableness case under Revised Section 9-
603(a) is Financial Federal Credit Inc. v. Boss Transportation, Inc.128
where the debtor claimed the secured party's repossession sale was not
commercially reasonable. To counter the argument, the secured party
pointed to the security agreement, arguing it had complied with its
proscriptions. The clause in question read:
Debtor agrees that any public or private sale shall be
deemed commercially reasonable (i) if notice of such sale is
121. U.C.C. § 9-602 (1999). See ZINNECKEH, supra note 34, at 1122, 1152-53.
122. U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (1999).
123. Id., U.C.C. § 9-627 (1999).
124. U.C.C. § 9-602(6) (1999).
125. Id. at § 9-603(b) (1999).
126. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1995).
127. See, infra notes 128-33, and accompanying text for Revised Article 9 cases. For former
Article 9 cases, see Zinnecker, supra note 35, at 1122, 1152-53.
128. Financial Federal Credit Inc. v. Boss Transportation, Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 1367 (M.D. Ca.
2006).
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mailed to Debtor . . . at least ten (10) days prior to the
date of any public sale or after which any private sale
will occur; (ii) if notice of any public sale is published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the county where
the sale will occur at least once within the ten (10) days
prior to the sale; (iii) whether the items are sold in bulk,
singly, or in such lots as Secured Party may elect; (iv)
whether or not the items sold are in Secured Party's
possession and present at the time and place of sale; and
(v) whether or not Secured Party refurbishes, repairs, or
prepares the items for sale. Secured Party may be the
purchaser at any public sale. . . .129
Citing Section 9-603(a), the court stated that "[a]ccording to
Georgia law, the parties may determine by agreement the standards of
the sale, 'if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable."' 3 0 The
court found the clause's standards were not manifestly unreasonable.
Here, Plaintiff and Defendants agreed upon the standards for a
commercially reasonable sale of the collateral in both Security
Agreements. These standards are not "manifestly unreasonable" and in
fact provide more descriptive rights and duties for the parties than the
court of appeals addressed in Walker. The agreed upon standards also
meet the requirements set out by the court of appeals for a
"commercially reasonable sale," because the standards provide a
reasonable time and manner for the sale during business hours, in a
public setting, with adequate notice, and conditions reasonably
calculated to bring a fair market price.13'
In reviewing the repossession sale itself, the court said "The
uncontroverted facts show that Plaintiff met the standards and
requirements of a public sale of the tractors and trailers . . . Therefore,
the uncontroverted facts establish that Plaintiff complied with the
agreed upon, commercially reasonable standards, for the public sale of
the collateral." 32 Similar cases have made similar analyses.'33
129. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 1373.
131. Id. at 1373-74.
132. Financial Federal Credit, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
133. See, e.g., In In re Adobe Trucking, Inc 76 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 365 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011),
a commercial reasonableness case, the security agreement included "provisions addressing activities
that are deemed to be commercially reasonable." Id. at 9. The court noted that revised Section 9-
603(a) "expressly provides that '[t]he parties may determine by agreement the standards measuring
the fulfillment of the rights of a debtor . . . and the duties of a secured party . . . if the standards are
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As a preliminary, general observation, compare two aspects of the
Financial Federal clause against the Wombles clause. First, the
Financial Federal clause explicitly identifies the mandatory Section 9-
602 duty in question, commercial reasonableness. In contrast, the
Wombles clause does not explicitly mention the mandatory no breach of
peace duty. Because this first aspect is mainly relevant to the Section 9-
603 strand's requirement that the clause implicate the no breach of
peace duty, discussed in Section B, unless otherwise indicated, this
Section A assumes that the 2014 Wombles court would construe the
Wombles clause's phrase "it shall be lawful" in effect to mean "it shall
not be a breach of the peace."' 34 Thus, as construed, the Wombles clause
says "it shall not be a breach of the peace for the secured party or agent
to take possession of the Mortgaged Property, at any time wherever it
may be and to enter any premises . . . without liability for trespass."
Under this assumed construction, like the Financial Federal clause, the
Wombles clause identifies the mandatory duty in question: to refrain
from breaching the peace. The Article relaxes this assumed construction
later in Section A, and in Section B when discussing whether the
Wombles clause implicates the duty not to breach the peace.
Second, the Financial Federal clause explicitly deems a public or
private sale of collateral is commercially reasonable (thus satisfying that
mandatory duty) if specific acts are followed (e.g., "if notice of such sale
is mailed to Debtor . . . at least ten (10) days prior to the date of any
public sale or after which any private sale will occur."). While applying
Section 9-603(a), the Financial Federal court called these acts "agreed
upon . . . standards for a commercially reasonable sale of the collateral,"
thus implicitly concluding that the clause contained "standards
measuring the fulfillment of" the commercial reasonableness duty.3 5
Like the Financial Federal clause, the Wombles clause as construed in
effect deems a repossession meets its corresponding mandatory duty not
not manifestly unreasonable."' Id. at 9. The court held that "Under the procedures analysis, the
sale was commercially reasonable because the standards set forth in the Credit Agreement were not
manifestly unreasonable and PNC fully complied with its terms." Id at 14. See also Coxall v. Clover
Commercial Corp., 4 Misc.3d 654, 781 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2004) (stating "the Contract
between the Coxalls and Clover Commercial provides that, after repossession, Clover "can sell the
vehicle after 10 days notice," and that "notice will be reasonable if . . . sent . . . to your current
address . . . at least 10 days . .. hefore seller acts on the notice." Article 9 would permit such an
agreement unless it is "manifestly unreasonable." (See Revised UCC§§ 9-603[a], 9-602[7].)).
134. Recall that the Wombles clause read "[i]t shall be lawful for [the secured party or agent] to
take possession of the Mortgaged Property, at any time wherever it may be and to enter any
premises ... without liability for trespass . . . ." Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 602.
135. Financial Federal Credit, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74.
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to breach the peace ("it shall be lawful") where the secured party does
specific things: enters "at any time," and enters "wherever it [the
collateral] may be located."13 6 As such, like the Financial Federal court,
arguably the 2014 Wombles court would find that the Wombles clause
affects "standards measuring the fulfillment of" under the Section 9-603
strand's requirement.
This conclusion seems in accord with several commentators'
characterization of Section 9-603(a)'s "standards measuring the
fulfillment of' requirement. Professor Zinnecker says it "define[s] the
contours of" 37 and "define[s] standards of performance"138 with respect
to the mandatory rules under Section 9-602. Similarly, Professor
Lemelman characterizes Section 9-603(a) as allowing the parties "to set
the standard by which action under any one or more of the basic
provisions of § 9-602 may be measured," and "to set reasonable
benchmarks for . . . self help procedures." 39 Further, as discussed more
fully in Section B, even if the phrase "it shall be lawful" is not construed
to mean "it shall not be a breach of the peace," recall Professor
Lawrence's clause where "the debtor consents to the secured party
entering into the debtor's premises to repossess the collateral at any time
that the debtor is not present, whether or not the premises are
locked." 40 Like the Wombles clause, the Lawrence clause does not
mention the no breach of peace duty specifically, but it does list specific
conduct consented to by the debtor with respect to repossession. By
concluding that this clause runs afoul of Section 9-603(b), Professor
Lawrence must believe that its language affects standards measuring the
fulfillment of the duty not to breach the peace. Finally, Professors
Warren and Walt, by saying that giving their Wombles-like clause
exculpatory weight "would be difficult to do" under Section 9-603(b),
must believe that the Wombles clause satisfies the "standards measuring
the fulfillment of' requirement.141
136. Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 602.
137. ZINNECKEIH, supra note 35, at 1122 (1999).
138. Id. at 1123.
139. IIERBEHT LEMELMAN, 25A MASS. PHAC., MANUAL ON UNIFOIRM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9:222 (3d ed.) (Current through the 2011 Pocket Parts).
140. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-603:4.
141. WAIHEN & WALT, TEACHEH'S MANUAL, supra note 8, at 112. They do say that the
Wombles clause is not a waiver of the duty not to breach of the peace, and it seems unlikely they
would believe it affects a variance of that duty. Thus, by default, they must believe the clause
affects standards measuring fulfillment of that duty. Beyond this last sentence, why they believe
this they do not say.
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Scrutinizing Professor Warren and Lopucki's textbook and
Teacher's Manual does not reveal their view as to whether or not they
believe the Wombles clause (or their two proffered repossession clauses)
contain standards measuring the fulfillment of the no breach of peace
duty within the meaning of the Section 9-603 strand. With respect to
part 3.2.d of the problem, they state that "If our security agreement has
a provision in it authorizing us to pick the lock-or even cut it-
Wombles Charters v. Orix Credit Alliance . . . is authority for doing it."42
The emphasized language suggests that Professors Warren and Lopucki
believe that Wombles remains good law (it "is authority"; present tense)
for the proposition that that under Revised Article 9 a secured party
permissibly may use a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like
circumstances.
With respect to part 3.2.e of their problem, Professor Warren and
Lopucki state
Nothing in the security agreement can relieve the
secured party of its obligation to avoid a breach of the
peace through confrontation. The debtor cannot waive
the §9-609 'breach of the peace' limitation. U.C.C. §9-
602(6). But Wombles Charters . . . is one of several cases
that give effect to provisions in the security agreement
that consents to entry to land or buildings to effect a
repossession when the debtor is not present.143
Here too they seem to suggest Wombles remains good law under
Revised Article 9 ("But Wombles Charters . . . give[s] effect"; present
tense). Yet in both problem parts, nothing they say suggests the reason
they believe that under Revised Article 9 a secured party permissibly
may use a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances is because
the Wombles clause does not affect "standards measuring the fulfillment
of" within the meaning of the Section 9-603 strand.
Given their complete silence on the issue, and given both the case
law and commentary discussed above, it seems likely that if put the
question Professors Warren and Lopucki also would conclude that the
Wombles clause affects standards measuring the fulfillment of the no
breach of peace duty. That is because, again assuming that the Wombles
clause's "it shall be lawful" term means "it shall not be a breach of the
peace," the Wombles clause in effect deems specific conduct or acts
142. WARREN & LOPUCKI, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38.
143. Id.
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comport with a mandatory Section 9-602 duty, in this case the duty to
not breach the peace. Thus, like the Financial Federal court, it is highly
probable the 2014 Wombles court would find that the Wombles clause
affects "standards measuring the fulfillment of" within the meaning of
the Section 9-603 strand. Consequently, under the assumed
construction, this is not the likely doctrinal explanation for the battle of
the professorial titans over the continued effectiveness of Wombles under
Revised Article 9.14
2. Arguments that the Wombles Clause Does Not Affect Standards
Measuring the Fulfillment of Requirement of the Section 9-
603(b) Strand
One way a repossession clause would not create standards measuring
the fulfillment of the no breach of peace duty is where its language
instead merely sets forth an accurate restatement of Article 9 statutory
and/or case law. Consider, for example, the following clause.
After default, a secured party may take possession of the
collateral; and without removal, may render equipment
unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises
under Section 9-610 of the UCC, and may proceed under
the previous clause pursuant to judicial process or
without judicial process if it proceeds without breach of
the peace.145
Clearly this clause expressly implicates the secured party's duty not
to breach the peace. However, because it simply restates the text of
Revised 9-609(a) and (b), 146 it is not a waiver, variance, or standard
measuring fulfillment of any right or duty, let alone the duty not to
breach the peace.'4 7 The Article calls this the Restatement of Law test.
144. Whether relaxing this assumption would alter this conclusion is discussed in Section B. See
infra notes 153-70, and accompanying text.
145. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
146. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999) (Revised Section 9-609 states that "after default, as secured party: (1)
may take possession of the collateral; and (2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and
dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises").
147. Professor Sepinuck says that "Parties often include in their written agreement provisions
on remedies for breach. Occasionally, these provisions simply restate what the law already provides.
For example, it is not unusual for a security agreement to authorize the secured party to repossess
and sell the collateral after default, rights that Article 9 expressly grants. See U.C.C. §§ 9-609(a)(1),
9-610(a)." Sepinuck, supra note 22, at 3. See also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text
discussing Global Casting and the role of former Section 9-503 versus the security agreement
repossession clause. See also Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750, 22 UCC Rep.
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Would the Wombles clause be sheltered under the Restatement of
Law test? Comparing the Wombles clause to the above model clause, the
Wombles clause clearly ranges beyond a restatement of Section 9-609.
Under the assumption that the term "it shall be lawful for" in the
Wombles clause is construed by the 2014 Wombles court to mean "it shall
not be a breach of the peace," it would be difficult to argue that the
Wombles clause as construed ex ante is an accurate restatement of New
York breach of peace law. Recall the Wombles clause says in part that it
"shall be lawful for [the secured party or agent] to take possession of
[collateral], . . . at any time wherever it may be . . . ."148 From the ex ante
perspective before any actual repossession takes place, unless it is really
New York law that the secured party's entry "shall not be a breach of
the peace," no matter when the secured party enters the premises, be it
9 a.m. or 3 a.m., and regardless of where the collateral is located (e.g.,
locked warehouse owned by a third party and guarded by a security
officer and two pit bulls), then the Wombles clause does not pass the
Restatement of Law test.149 This conclusion, however, does not mean
necessarily that the clause is invalid under the Section 9-603 strand; it
just eliminates one argument that the clause is valid under the Section
Serv. 1298, (Fla. App. 1977) (stating that the court needed to "decide whether the secured party's
right to repossess collateral provided by the Florida UCC in [former Section 9-503] includes a right
to enter upon private property, or whether the statute simply authorizes creditors to contract for
that right," noting that former Section 9-503 'is no more than a codification or restatement of a
common law right and a contract right recognized long before the promulgation thereof and creates
no new rights.' . . .", and that "Courts in other jurisdictions have held a secured creditor privileged,
under the UCC or the common law, to peacefully enter on the debtor's land when the security
agreement authorizes repossession but does not specifically authorize entry. . . . While many of the
cases approving entry by a creditor have involved a contract clause specifically authorizing entry,
we have not found or been directed to any case holding a creditor liable because a security
agreement lacked such a clause," and holding that "absent a contrary agreement, when a security
agreement provides the secured party has on default the rights and remedies provided by the UCC,
the right of repossession stated by [former Section 9-503] implies, just as it did at common law, a
limited privilege to enter on the debtor's land. The privilege may be exercised only 'without breach
of the peace."' Id. Why even bother putting a clause in the contract that does nothing more than
restate the breach of peace law? With criticism, Professor Sepinuck suggests one reason is because
"careful transactional lawyers seek comfort in the safety blanket of redundancy. Sepinuck,
supra note 22, at 3.
148. Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Scrv.2d at 602 (emphasis added).
149. From the ex post perspective after the actual repossession has occurred, under the
Otherwise BOP test discussed in Part IV, Section C, a court may find that the secured party
entered the debtor's commercial premises at a reasonable time, and that there was no breach of
peace even ignoring the repossession clause. In that event, here is an example of conflicting clause
validity outcomes depending on the analysis/test applied and the temporal perspective adopted.
See infra notes 244-3 and accompanying text.
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9-603 strand. 50 The issues posed by the Wombles clause under the
Restatement of Law test also would pertain to the two Warren and
Lopucki clauses in varying degrees. The Article's discussion, however,
goes no further here, but revisits these issues in Section B.15'
Another way a repossession clause would not create standards
measuring the fulfillment of the no breach of peace duty is to concede
that the clause affects standards, such as authorized repossession
conduct like lock cutting, but argue that the clause has insufficient
measuring fulfillment language to satisfy this Section 9-603 strand
requirement. Because this issue is best illustrated while also talking
about the breach of peace duty requirement, the Article develops the
analysis in Section B.152
B. DUTY NOT To BREACH THE PEACE?
This Section explores the Section 9-603 strand's statutory
requirement that the agreement's fulfillment measuring standards pertain
to the secured party's mandatory duty not to breach the peace. Even if a
repossession clause affects standards measuring fulfillment, if such
standards do not measure the fulfillment of the secured party's duty to
refrain from breaching the peace, the clause does not run afoul of the
Section 9-603 strand. Could a disagreement on whether this requirement
is fulfilled be the explanation for the battle of the titans? Vamos a ver.
1. Arguments that the Wombles Clause Standards Do or Do Not
Measure Fulfillment of the Duty Not to Breach the Peace
There are a number of arguments why the Wombles clause standards
do or do not measure fulfillment of the duty not to breach the peace.
a. No Mention of the No Breach of Peace Duty and/or No
Deeming Language Argument
Consider again the Financial Federal clause which explicitly
deemed a public or private sale to be commercially reasonable if certain
150. What if the Wombles clause was not so construed in effect to deem the authorized conduct
not to be a breach of the peace? Would this change the outcome under the Restatement of Law
test? See infra notes 153-70, and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 153-70 and accompanying text.
152. See id.
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acts were followed (e.g., "if notice of such sale is mailed to Debtor . . . at
least ten (10) days prior to the date of any public sale or after which any
private sale will occur."). Thus, the clause specifically mentions the
mandatory Section 9-602 duty in question (commercial reasonableness).
Further, the "deeming" language operates to turn the clause's naked
standards (e.g., if notice of such sale is mailed) into standards that
measure the fulfillment of the commercial reasonableness duty (if the acts
are done, the duty is fulfilled, the sale is commercially reasonable).
Contrast this language with the Wombles clause, and the two Warren
and Lopucki clauses. None of them (1) explicitly refers to the no breach
of peace duty, nor (2) has language "deeming" the authorized conduct to
not be a breach of the peace.
Perhaps this explains the battle of the professorial titans. Could it
be, for example, that Professors Warren and Lopucki believe that the
omission of (1) an explicit mention of the duty not to breach the peace
and/or (2) explicit deeming language with respect to the clause's
standards (authorized conduct) means the Wombles clause does not
satisfy this requirement, and thus the clause is valid under the Section 9-
603 strand?
It would be an unlikely argument where the 2014 Wombles court
construes the language "it shall be lawful . . ." to be a synonym for "it
shall not be a breach the peace." As construed, the Wombles clause
would mean that "it shall not be a breach of the peace" to take
possession of the collateral "at any time wherever it may be and to enter
the premises." In that case, the Wombles clause in effect explicitly
deems the authorized conduct to not be a breach of the peace.
Consequently, the Wombles clause affects both (1) standards measuring
the fulfillment of (2) the no breach of peace duty, and is invalid under
the Section 9-603 strand. 5 3
But what if one relaxes the assumption that the 2014 Wombles
court construes the term "it shall be lawful" to mean "it shall not be a
breach of the peace?" In that case, one might argue that given the two
types of omissions discussed above, the Wombles clause's standards do
not measure the fulfillment of the no breach of peace duty, and thus the
clause is valid. Consider three cases that, while not directly on point,
suggest that while this is not a completely implausible argument, it is
not the likely explanation for the battle of the titans.
153. In this case, the Wombles clause as construed also would run afoul of the BOP Definition
test applied on an ex ante basis. See infra notes 245-50, and accompanying text.
310 Vol. 10:2
Summer 2014 THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF REVISED ARTICLE 9
In MBank Dallas,154 the debtor/guarantors argued that with
respect to the secured party's mandatory duty to provide "reasonable
notification" of a foreclose sale, the secured party MBank failed to
provide "reasonable notification" because it had not given them written
notice of the foreclosure sale, but rather only oral notification.
Although the court said former section 9-504(c) did not require written
notice, the debtor/guarantors argued that written notification was
required because, in compliance with former section 9-501(c), the parties
contractually had agreed that notice of the sale had to be "mailed
postage prepaid five calendar days" prior to the sale to constitute
"reasonable notification." 55
To support their argument, the debtor/guarantors relied on two
sections of the security agreement. The first was a section captioned
"Remedies of Bank Upon Default," stating in relevant part that "for the
purposes of the notice requirements of the Code, Bank and Pledgor agree
that notice given at least five (5) calendar days prior to the related
action hereunder is reasonable."' 56 The second section was captioned
"General," with a subsection captioned "Notice." That subsection
stated that "notice shall be deemed given or sent when mailed postage
prepaid to Pledgor's address given above or to Pledgor's most recent
address a shown by notice of change on file with Bank."157
In deciding whether and how either or both of these sections
affected the secured party's mandatory duty to provide reasonable
notification, the court said that:
We conclude that the only agreement that the parties
made regarding the standard by which fulfillment of the
reasonable notice requirement of the Code was to be
measured was that notice must be given at least five
days prior to any related action. We further conclude
that the "notice" subsection was simply a contractual
"mailbox" provision; that is, for the purpose of counting
the five day period if notice was mailed, it is deemed
given or sent when mailed and not when received by the
pledgor. Nowhere in the security agreement does MBank
[the secured party] agree that, for the purpose of the notice
154. MBank Dallas, N.A. v. Sunbelt Mfg., Inc., 710 S.W.2d 633, 634-635, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d
1412 (1986).
155. Id. at 636.
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
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requirement of the Code, notice must be sent by mail postage
prepaid to be reasonable, and we are not free to make a new
contract for the parties."5 8
Thus, for failure of the parties to have language in their security
agreement linking the "notice" subsection's standards to the mandatory
"reasonable notification" duty, the duty's fulfillment was not measured
by the "notice" subsection's standards.
Similarly, in Dearborn Capital Corp,5 9 the secured party (plaintiff)
presented an argument that it did not "need to comply with the UCC
regarding commercial reasonableness and notification relative to the
disposition of collateral" given the following language in a personal
guaranty:
[Plaintiff] may renew, extend, modify or transfer any
obligations of [Uni Boring] . . . or of co-guarantors, may
accept partial payments thereon or settle, release,
compound, compromise, collect or otherwise liquidate
any obligation or security therefor in any manner and
bind and purchase at any sale without affecting or
impairing the obligation of [defendant] hereunder. 6 0
Said the court:
Plaintiff [secured party] contends that this language
allowed it to settle its secured claim against Uni Boring
[debtor] in the manner that was undertaken. This
argument suggests that the UCC's requirements on the
disposition of collateral need not have been observed
simply because the personal guaranty allowed plaintiff
to reach a settlement with Uni Boring and others.161
Of this argument, the court notably said that "the contractual
language does not expressly preclude application of the UCC's provisions
regarding the disposition of collateral." 62 In a footnote following this
assertion, the court added "In other words, although there may have
been a right to settle, there is no contractual language indicating that
settlement could be made in a commercially unreasonable manner and
without notice."i6 3
158. MBank Dallas, 710 S.W.2d at 636-37 (emphasis added).
159. Dearborn Capital Co. v. Bravo, 2009 WL 3013077, at *6 (Mich. App. 2009).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id., n.10 (emphasis added). The court also said that "to the extent that the contractual
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Thus, in Dearborn Capital Corp, because of the absence of explicit
language linking the right to settlement clause to the twin duties of
commercial reasonableness and reasonable notice, the court implicitly
found that that clause (the standards) did not measure the fulfillment of
these mandatory duties (i.e., "that settlement could be made in a
commercially unreasonable manner and without notice.").
In contrast to these two cases, consider Bank of Guam, where the
court needed to determine if the secured party had given the debtor
"reasonable notification" of the repossession sale as required under
section 9-504(3) of former Article 9.164 To do so, the court said that a
"review of the notice provisions contained in the parties' agreement is . .
. required," citing to former Section 9-501(3).165 Similar to Revised
Section 9-603(a), former Section 9-501(3) provides that:
[t]o the extent that they give rights to the debtor and
impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated in
the subdivisions referred to below may not be waived or
varied except as provided with respect to compulsory
disposition of collateral (subdivision (3) of Section 9504
and Section 9505). . . but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the fulfillment of these
rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable . . . .166
Thus, the court examined "[tjhe language of the Preferred Ship
Mortgage . . . to determine whether it articulated the standards by
which section 9504(3) was to be met, and if so, whether such standards
were reasonable." In relevant part, the agreement said:
With or without legal process, and with or without prior
notice or demand, seize or take possession of the vessel;
and with or without possession sell said property, at
public auction free from any claim of Shipowner, first
however, giving notice of the time and place of said sale by
language in the personal guaranty suggests that there is no need to comply with the UCC regarding
commercial reasonableness and notification relative to the disposition of collateral, the language
would be invoking a waiver of, or varying the rules in, [Revised Sections 9-610 and 9-611], which is
not permissible for the reasons stated above." Id. at 6, referring to an earlier discussion of Revised
Section 9 -6 02 (g), and that "any language in the personal guaranty that could be read as waiving or
varying the rules governing notification of a collateral disposition [Revised Section 9-611], would
have no force or effect unless the exception in [Revised Section 9-624] was applicable." Id.
164. Bank of Guam v. Del Priore, 2007 WL 2460763 (Guam Terr. 2007).
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis in original).
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publishing the same for five consecutive days, except
Saturday, Sunday and any holiday, in a newspaper
published at or in the vicinity of the home port of the vessel,
and by mailing a copy thereof by registered mail to
Shipowner at the address of Shipowner hereinbelow
specified and such sale may be held at such place and at
such time as Mortgagee in such notice may have
specified, or such sale may be adjourned by Mortgagee
from time to time by announcement at the time and
place appointed for such sale or for such adjourned sale
and without further priority over this Mortgage. 67
Note that the clause did not state that (1) certain conduct would be
"deemed to satisfy" (2) former Section 9-504(3)'s reasonable notification
requirement. In other words, there was no explicit deeming language,
nor any specific mention of the mandatory secured party duty in
question. Nevertheless, the court said that "Although this provision
does not explicitly mention [former] section 9503(3), it clearly outlines
the manner in which notice of a sale of the collateral should be given to
Del Priore [the debtor]."1 68 Thus, despite the clause's omission of both a
specific mention of the reasonable notice duty and explicit "deeming"
language, given the nature of the standards set forth in the clause
("clearly outlines the manner in which notice of a sale of the collateral
should be given"), the court found that the clause's standards did
measure the fulfillment of that duty. Consequently, the court held that
the secured party "was still required to give notice pursuant to the terms
to which it agreed in the mortgage because of [former] section
9501(3)(b)." 69
The Wombles clause, (and Warren and Lopucki's two clauses),
specifically authorize conduct in the context of a repossession. In this
sense, one can argue that these clauses are more analogous to that in
Bank of Guam than those in MBank Dallas and Dearborn Capital Corp.
On this score, it would not be surprising, or unlikely, that given the
nature of the standards in the Wombles clause, the 2014 Wombles court
would similarly link a Wombles-like clause's standards to the no breach
of peace duty. In support of this assertion, recall that the Lawrence
clause does not mention the "no breach of peace" duty, nor does it
167. Bank of Guam, 2007 WL 2460763 (emphasis in original).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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contain explicit "deeming" language. However, it does specifically
describe conduct that the secured party is authorized to engage in
during its repossession. By concluding that his clause runs afoul of the
Section 9-603 strand, Professor Lawrence must believe that the clause
nevertheless affects standards measuring the fulfillment of the duty not
to breach the peace. His ex ante perspective rationale is that the
authorized conduct "would have too great a tendency to lead to a
violent confrontation,"o170 and thus a breach of the peace.
Given this analysis, different views about the doctrinal effect of the
absence in the Wombles clause of an explicit reference to the no breach of
peace duty and "deeming" language with respect to the authorized
conduct is a possible, although unlikely, explanation for professor titans'
differing views of the continued efficacy of a Wombles-like clause in
Wombles-like circumstances under Revised Article 9.
b. Duty vs. Rights Argument
Another way a repossession clause would not pertain to the duty not
to breach the peace, and thus not run afoul of the Section 9-603 strand,
is if it pertained instead to an Article 9 secured party's right. Take, for
example, a simple enter the premises clause derived from a third Warren
and Lopucki clause not discussed above. In part 3.2.b. of their
textbook's problem, they posit a commercial premises (nonstructure)
scenario of a secured party wanting to repossess a bulldozer owned by
the debtor (a subcontractor), on a site owned by a third party (a
developer), around which another third party (the general contractor)
has erected a fence, but at which there is no guard.17' They state that
"If the security agreement gives [the secured party] the right to enter, the
logic of Wombles Charters ... would seem to approve the picking of locks
on the debtor's premises."1 72 Adding slightly to this italicized aspect of
the clause creates what the Article calls a simple enter the premises
clause: "Upon default, the secured party has the right to enter the
debtor's premises." Variations of this simple enter the premises clause
are quite common in security agreements. 73
170. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-603:4. As to why Professor Lawrence appears to
be adopting an ex ante perspective rather than an ex post one, see infra notes 256-62, and
accompanying text.
171. WAHREN & LOPUCKI, SECURED CRIEDIT, supra note 9, at 54.
172. WAIttEN & LOPUCKI, TEACIER'S MANUA L, supra note 12, at 37-38 (emphasis added).
173. See, e.g., ALCES, IIANSFORD, E' AL., supra note 80, at § 34:18. ("The security agreement
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One can argue that this simple right to enter the premises clause
does not pertain to the breach of the peace duty but instead to the
secured party's statutory right to repossession and its derivative right
(privilege) to enter the debtor's premises. As discussed infra Part I,
there is a statutory distinction between the secured party's right to take
possession and derivative right (privilege) to enter the premises from the
secured party's duty not to breach the peace while exercising these
rights when repossessing the collateral and entering the premises.' 74
Consequently, the argument would run, a clause that provides a secured
party the right to repossess the collateral and/or the derivative right
(privilege) to enter the debtor's premises would not pertain to the duty
to refrain from breaching the peace, and thus would fail to meet this
Section 9-603 strand requirement. Concomitantly, such a clause
arguably would be a contractual restatement of Article 9 repossession
law (Section 9-609(a)(1) for the right to possess the collateral and case
law for the derivative right (privilege) to enter the debtor's premises),
and thus also would pass the Restatement of Law test. As such, the
simple enter the premises clause would not run afoul of the Section 9-603
strand. Professor Sepinuck appears to recognize the merit of this
argument, advising secured parties to put such clauses in their contracts,
and noting Section 9-609 statutory right to repossess the collateral as
long as there is no breach of the peace duty.175 Thus, at least with
should contain a provision that the secured party can enter the debtor's land on default, care for the
goods, and remove them as necessary. Moreover, the debtor should be required to assist the secured
party in any manner necessary.); BLANCIlARD, MARIEVA & DORSEY, supra note 37, at § 15:20
(stating that "Many security agreements, in contrast, expressly state that the debtor consents to
the creditor's entry [into premises] for purposes of taking the collateral. This contract language
attempts to build an argument that later entry after default was with the debtor's consent,
permissible under breach of the peace standards."); RUSCII & SEPINUCK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 28, at 144 (stating that "The security agreement may-and if it is well drafted, will-
expressly authorize entry onto the debtor's property."); DECPG, supra note 81, §11.09, at 11-87
(stating that the security agreement "may expressly permit the secured party to enter upon the
premises where the collateral is located for the purpose of repossession (Form 11-2, subparagraphs
7(c) and (d))."). Interestingly, Feldman and Nimmer call their permission to enter the premises
clause a "post-default performance standard." To escape the Section 9-603 strand's prohibition,
they would have to argue that despite their moniker, the permission to enter the premises clause is
not a standard measuring fulfullment of within the meaning of that Section 9-603 strand
requirement, or if it is such a standard, it does not pertain to the duty to refrain from breaching the
peace under this requirement.
174. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text. Section 9-609(a)(1) provides the secured
party the right to take possession of the collateral (and implicitly to enter the premises to do so),
while Section 9-609(b)(2) imposes upon the secure party to the duty not to breach the peace during
the repossession and entry onto the debtor's premises. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
175. Sepinuck, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that the security agreement should "Expressly
authorize the secured party and its representatives to enter the debtor's property after default to
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respect to the simple right to enter the premises clause aspect of the
clause in their problem's part 3.2.b., Professors Warren and Lopucki
would find some support for the proposition that this aspect is
permissible under Revised Article 9.176
Similarly, perhaps Professors Warren and Lopucki were thinking
about this rights vs. duty distinction when they penned their clause in
part 3. 2 .e of their problem. After all, they state in relevant part:
Nothing in the security agreement can relieve the
secured party of its obligation to avoid a breach of the
peace through confrontation. The debtor cannot waive
the §9-609 "breach of the peace" limitation. But
Wombles Charters . . . is one of several cases that give
effect to provisions in the security agreement that
consents to entry to land or buildings to effect a repossession
when the debtor is not present." 7 7
By beginning the last sentence with the word "but," one might
infer that Professors Warren and Lopucki believe this clause, and thus
the Wombles clause, does not "relieve the secured party of its obligation
to avoid a breach of the peace through confrontation," nor waive the §9-
609 "breach of the peace" "limitation" because it merely restates the
secured party's right of repossession and derivative right of entry into
the debtor's premises, and thus does not run afoul of the Section 9-603
strand.
This inference, however, has less traction with respect to their
discussions in other parts of their problem. Revisiting their simple enter
the premises clause aspect in problem 3.2.b, Professors Warren and
Lopucki also say that "the logic of Wombles Charters . . . would seem to
approve the picking of locks on the debtor's premises." 78 If the 2014
Wombles court follows this logic, and ex post after an actual repossession
construes its simple right to enter the premises clause aspect in this way
to exculpate the secured party from breach of peace liability, then as
applied the clause would pertain to the duty not to breach the peace, and
would run afoul of the Section 9-603(b) strand. 179  Alternatively,
repossess collateral. Section 9-609 grants a secured party the right to take possession of collateral
after default, provided it acts without a breach of the peace."). See also supra note 147.
176. See supra notes 171, 175, and accompanying text.
177. WAHREN & LOPUCKI, TEACHEH'S MANUAL, supra note 11, at 37-38 (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. See also infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. In that case, the exculpatory clause
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perhaps here the professors mean only to note the "logic of Wombles
Charters," and not to suggest this logic makes sense under Revised
Article 9.
Even more difficult to reconcile with the Section 9-603 strand is
their problem, part 3.2.d where Professors Warren and Lopucki present
a clause explicitly authorizing the secured party to cut locks.i80 Here,
relying on the rights vs. duty distinction and/or the Restatement of Law
test to argue that this clause passes muster under the Revised Article 9
is a heavy lift. As discussed above, Professor Lawrence's ex ante clause
validity analysis holds that a clause authorizing conduct that "would
have too great a tendency to lead to a violent confrontation,"181 runs
afoul of the Section 9-603 strand. Presumably, given his own clause,
Professor Lawrence would believe that the Warren and Lopucki clause
authorizing forceful conduct like lock cutting would implicate the no
breach of peace duty, and be prohibited under the Section 9-603 strand
(assuming its other two requirements were met).182 And if used ex post to
exculpate the secured party from breach of peace liability for lock
cutting, then the Warren and Lopucki clause functionally would pertain
to the duty not to breach the peace as well. 83
Summarizing the last two paragraphs, for the clause in problem
part 3.2.b as construed, and for the clause in problem part 3.2.d as
written, usmig the rights vs. duty distinction and/or the Restatement of
Law test to argue that these clauses do not violate the Section 9-603
strand becomes an increasingly difficult argument to make.'84
Consequently, these arguments alone do not appear to be a likely
would not pass the Restatement of Law test either. On the other hand, if the 2014 Wombles court
under the Wombles-like circumstances of the repossession found the lock picking to affect entry was
not a breach of the peace even where it ignored the clause's exculpatory effect, then from an ex post
perspective the clause would pass muster under the Section 9-603 strand, but not due to the rights
vs. duty distinction but rather the Otherwise BOP test. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying
text. In this case, whether the Restatement of Law test would shelter the clause as applied is
debatable. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
180. Recall that in part 3.2.d they pose the scenario of a secured party wanting to repossess a
bulldozer owned by the debtor where the debtor keeps it "in a locked, steel building on the debtor's
own property." Id. at 54. They state that "[i]f our security agreement has a provision in it
authorizing us to pick the lock-or even cut it-Wombles Charters v. Orix Credit Alliance . . . is
authority for doing it. Of course, if there is a confrontation, we will have to withdraw." (emphasis
added). WARREN & LOPUCKL, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38.
181. See supra notes 110, 170, and accompanying text and see infra notes 255-62 and
accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., supra notes 95-118.
183. In both cases, the clause would not run afoul of the Section 9-603 strand. See supra notes
179 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 179 and accompanying text.
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explanation for the differing views between the professorial titans over
whether Wombles remains good law under Revised Article 9.
Given this analysis, one can draw a similar conclusion about the
validity under Revised Article 9 of a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like
circumstances. Shielding a Wombles-like clause from the Section 9-603
strand's reach by arguing that the clause merely restates the secured
party's right to enter the debtor's premises would be a heavy lift. The
clause provides more than a simple right to enter the premises; it allows
the secured party to enter at any time and any place the collateral is
located. Under Professor Lawrence's ex ante clause validity analysis,
authorizing this conduct by contract may be sufficient to implicate the
duty not to breach the peace.18 Even if the 2014 Wombles court did not
use this ex ante analysis,186 if the 2014 Wornbles court (arguably like the
1990 Wombles court) ex post construes the clause to exculpate the
secured party from breach of peace liability, then as applied the clause
does pertain to the duty not to breach the peace and would run afoul of
the Section 9-603(b) strand.8 7
c. The No Trespass Liability Shelter Argument
A related, but distinct, argument that the Wombles clause does not
pertain to the duty not to breach the peace, and thus would be valid
under the Section 9-603 strand, focuses on its "no trespass liability"
language. Recall the clause said "[I]t shall be lawful for [the secured
party or agent] to take possession of the Mortgaged Property, at any
time wherever it may be and to enter any premises . . . without liability
for trespass . . . ."188 Given this trespass liability language, one might
argue that the Wombles clause seeks only to exculpate the secured party
from trespass liability, and not from liability for breaching the peace.
Again, one can point out that on its face the Wombles clause does not
explicitly mention the secured party's Article 9 mandatory no breach of
peace duty. Rather, it mentions trespass liability, thus suggesting that
it was this tort liability, not breach of peace liability, that was the
subject of the clause's fulfillment measuring standards. Thus, the
argument would run, the Wombles clause does not pertain to the duty
185. See supra notes 170, 181, and accompanying text and see infra notes 255-62 and
accompanying text.
186. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
188. Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv.2d at 602.
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not to breach the peace, which, in turn means that the clause is not
voided by the Section 9-603 strand.
This is not a fanciful argument. Recall that the 1990 Wombles court
addressed the trespass liability issue before the breach of peace issue.
The court explicitly relied on the Wombles clause to find no trespass
occurred notwithstanding a posted "No Trespassing" sign when the
secured party entered the commercial premises by cutting a lock. Thus,
the secured party had no trespass liability. After this conclusion the
court then addressed the breach of peace issue, finding no breach of
peace had occurred. But nowhere in its breach of peace analysis did the
court mention the clause, let alone that it relied on the clause in finding
no breach of peace had occurred. Nevertheless, one can make the
argument that while not explicit, the 1990 Wombles court found no
breach of peace occurred because there was no trespass, and it had found
there was no trespass because of the clause, ergo the clause indirectly
affected the court's no breach of peace conclusion. For example,
Professors Warren and Lopucki observed that "The [Wombles] court
held that this repossession was not a breach of the peace because the
security agreement signed by the debtor permitted the creditor to "enter
any premises . . . without liability for trespass." 89 Perhaps it is reading
too much into this sentence, but it appears that they believe the
contractual negation of trespass liability was at least one reason the
1990 Wombles court held there was no breach of the peace. If this is
what they meant, they would not be alone.190
Does this no trespass liability shelter argument explain the battle of
the titans over whether a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like
circumstances is valid under the Revised Article 9? The answer likely is
no. First, nothing in what Professors Warren and Walt say indicates
whether they do or do not subscribe to the no trespass shelter liability
argument. Second, as with the rights vs. duty distinction argument, the
problem with this no trespass liability shelter argument is that if the
secured party in the 2014 Wombles case attempts to use the Wombles
clause, in particular its no trespass liability term, to exculpate itself
189. WARREN & LOPUCKI, SECURED CHEDIT, supra note 9, at 54.
190. See Donnelly & Donnelly, supra note 75, at 344 (stating that "In Womhles the plaintiffs
argued that the repossession of a bus violated N.Y. UCC section 9-503 because during that self-help
repossession there was a trespass on plaintiff's property despite "No Trespassing" signs and because
defendants cut a lock to enter plaintiff's property. The Southern District held these actions did not
violate N.Y. UCC section 9-503 because the security agreement authorized the creditor to enter the
debtor's premises "without liability for trespass.").
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from breach of peace liability, then as applied the clause does pertain to
the duty not to breach the peace and would run afoul of the Section 9-
603(b) strand. This would be true even where forceful conduct qua
trespass is not actionable given the clause, but would be actionable qua
breach of peace absent the clause. Put another way, if conduct like lock
cutting used to enter a premises is otherwise a breach of the peace, it
should be no defense to say that because the clause effectively renders
the entry by lock cutting conduct nonactionable trespass, then that
same conduct also cannot amount to actionable breach of the peace.' 9'
If the contrary held true, then the new statutory prohibition would be
undermined through this loophole of contractual validity under trespass
law, thus sanitizing what would have been, absent the clause, actionable
breach of peace conduct.
In summary, none of the analyses under Section A and B's straight
statutory application of the Section 9-603 strand's requirements
produced a fully satisfactory explanation for the divergent views about
whether a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances is
permitted under the Revised Article 9. There are, however, other
possible explanations.
C. THE OTHERWISE BOP TEST
Swirling around Sections A and B's discussions of whether and
when a clause affects standards measuring the fulfillment of the no
breach of peace duty is this idea: A repossession clause is prohibited
under the Section 9-603 strand where, absent the clause, its authorized
conduct would be a breach of peace.192 Indeed, several commentators
191. SEPINUCK, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that "If the security agreement authorizes the
secured party to enter the debtor's premises, it may help avoid any trespass claim. This
authorization will not, by itself, be sufficient to prevent a breach of the peace and will be irrelevant
if the debtor does not own or rent the premises where the collateral is located, but may nevertheless
be helpful."). See also RUscil & SEPINUCK, SECUE) TRANSACTIONS, supra note 28, at 144 (stating
that "The security agreement may-and if it is well drafted, will-expressly authorize entry onto
the debtor's property. That should insulate a repossession effort from being an actionable trespass,
at least if the debtor does not revoke that authorization before or during the repossession attempt,
but will not necessarily satisfy the prohibition on breach of the peace."); RusCii & SEPINUCK,
TEACHlER'S MANUAl., supra note 85, at 115 (stating that "Even if the security agreement authorizes
the secure party to enter, that merely avoids a trespass, not a breach of the peace. Nothing in the
security agreement can relieve the secured party of its obligation to avoid a breach of the peace.
Sections 9-602, 9-603."). See infra notes 192-98, and accompanying text.
192. For example, recall the qualifying argument that a simple enter the premises clause
implicates the duty not to breach the peace if the court construes it to authorize lock cutting, and
then relies on this authorization to find no breach of peace occurred. In this case, the simple enter
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have characterized the new statutory prohibition as functionally
banning clauses agreeing, authorizing, or consenting to specific acts or
conduct that would otherwise constitute a breach of the peace.'9 3 For
example, Professors White and Summers, opine that:
Under 9-602(6), a prospective consent in the security
agreement to a breach of the peace, or something that
would otherwise constitute a breach of the peace, is not
sufficient. The no breach of the peace rule is a statement
of public policy, and a prospective agreement to consent
should be given no more weight than a prospective
agreement to tolerate a violent misdemeanor or felony.194
Professors White and Summers characterization of Section 9-602(6)
seems to prohibit two things: (1) broadly, a consent to commit an
unspecified breach of the peace, 195 and (2) narrowly, a consent to commit
a specific act or conduct ("something") that otherwise would be a breach
of the peace. Their latter, narrower characterization is Section C's topic,
and is named the Otherwise BOP test.
Beyond such brief characterizations, no commentator has
developed an analytical structure for the Otherwise BOP test. To flesh
out the Otherwise BOP test, imagine a secured party is relying on a
repossession clause to argue that an authorized act or conduct was not a
breach of the peace. To determine if the secured party's reliance on the
repossession clause is valid under the Otherwise BOP test, the court
would perform a type of but for analysis: But for the clause's
the clause as construed and applied ex post by the court implicates the duty not to breach the peace,
thus satisfying this requirement of the Section 9-603 strand. See supra notes 178-79 and
accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., WILIAM II. LAWRENCE, WILLIAM H1. HENNING, R. WILSON FREYERMUTil,
UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS, 425 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2007) (stating that "[G]iven
the strong policy in favor of deterring violence, the Code makes clear that a security agreement may
not authorize a secured party to engage in conduct that would otherwise constitute a breach of
peace.") See also BARRON & WESSMAN, supra note 91, at 172 (stating about Section 9-603(b) that it
"excepts the duty to refrain from breaching of the peace from the more general rule that the parties
may by contract define that standards for measuring the secured party's fulfillment of his duties. It
would seem to follow that only the courts may define what constitutes a breach of peace, and that
conduct that is otherwise a breach of the peace cannot be cleansed by the debtor's advance consent
to it in the security agreement.").
194. WhilTE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at § 34-8, p. 384 (5th ed. 2002).
195. Id. By citing Section 9-602(6), they suggest that the prospective consent clause is a waiver
or a variance under Revised Section 9-602, rather than a standard measuring fulfillment under
Revised Section 9-603(a). As to the broader characterization, that seems correct. Thus a clause
that says "Debtor consents to the secured party breaching the peace" would be seen as waiver or a
variance of that duty. In contrast, White and Summers' second, narrower characterization of the
new statutory prohibition better fits within Section 9-603(b) and the Otherwise BOP test.
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exculpatory terms, would a court find the secured party's offending
conduct a breach of the peace? As applied below, with the but for
analysis the reviewing court would adopt a post-repossession
perspective, considering under the relevant Revised Article 9 sections
and relevant case law whether a breach of peace occurred under the facts
of the disputed repossession. In this sense, the Otherwise BOP test is
applied here on a functional,196 ex post repossession basis rather than an
ex ante pre-repossession basis.
Under this ex post perspective, the court's "but for" analysis would
entail two steps. Under the first step, the court would construe and
apply the repossession clause to the facts of the case. On the one hand,
if the court under the relevant Revised Article 9 sections and relevant
case law finds a breach of the peace occurred despite applying the
clause's exculpatory terms, then the secured party is liable for the
consequences. The Otherwise BOP test thus ends. On the other hand, if
the court finds no breach of peace occurred when applying the clause,
then the court must take a second step.
In step two, the court would ignore the repossession clause's
exculpatory terms.197 Then the court under the relevant Revised Article
9 sections and relevant case law would determine whether a breach of
peace occurred under the facts of the case. On the one hand, if when
ignoring the clause's exculpatory terms the court still concludes there
was no breach of the peace, then the clause passes the Otherwise BOP
test. In such an event, the clause's exculpatory terms are legally
irrelevant in the sense that since there is no breach of peace even when
196. The Otherwise BOP test is a functional approach to determining if a clause is invalid under
the Section 9-603 strand in this sense. Consider that it may be difficult ex ante to determine if a
clause is valid or not under the Section 9-603 strand. For example, under Professor Lawrence's ex
ante analysis, a secured party planning a repossession would need to be able to determine before any
contractually authorized conduct occurred whether such conduct "would have too high a tendency
to result in violence," an inquiry potentially fraught with uncertainty. Additionally, consider that
under an ex ante and/or ex post straight statutory analysis under the Section 9-603(b) strand, in a
particular set of circumstances, there may be a sound argument that one or more of the strand's
three requirements is not met, and thus the clause would be valid under the Section 9-603 strand.
Lastly, consider that in either case, if ex post the court applying the clause finds no breach of the
peace occurred where otherwise it would have found a breach of the peace, then functionally the
clause as applied is invalid under the Section 9-603 strand. Here we see the conundrum of different
analyses/tests performed from different temporal perspectives producing conflicting clause validity
results. This conundrum is discussed further infra in Section IV.D.
197. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 34-8, page 384. White and Summers in the 1995 4th,
2002 5th and 2010 6th editions make the following nearly identical assertion: "The courts generally
have reached sound conclusions in defining 'breach of the peace.' . . . For the most part, courts
ignore clauses purporting to authorize a repossession which results in a breach of the peace.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ignoring the clause, then there is no breach of peace to exculpate with
the clause.
On the other hand, if the court, when ignoring the clause, instead
concludes there was a breach of the peace, then the secured party fails
the Otherwise BOP test, and the clause is invalid under the Section 9-
603 strand. Consequently, the secured party would liable for breach of
the peace.
Would the Wombles clause under the 2014 Wombles case's facts fail
the Otherwise BOP test similarly applied? Under the "but for" analysis'
first step, the 2014 Wombles court would construe and apply the
repossession clause to the facts of the case. On the one hand, if the court
under the relevant Revised Article 9 sections and relevant case law finds
a breach of the peace occurred despite applying the clause's exculpatory
terms, then the secured party must suffer the consequences. 9 8 The
Otherwise BOP test ends. On the other hand, if the court finds no
breach of peace occurred when applying the clause, then the court must
go to the "but for" analysis' second step. To proceed further, assume
this has happened in the 2014 Wombles case.
In step two, the 2014 Wombles court would ignore the Wombles
clause's exculpatory terms. Then the court under the relevant Article 9
sections and relevant case law would determine whether a breach of
peace occurred under the facts of the case. On the one hand, if when
ignoring the clause's exculpatory terms the 2014 Wombles court still
concludes there was no breach of the peace, then the Wombles clause
passes the Otherwise BOP test. On the other hand, if the court when
ignoring the clause instead concludes there was a breach of the peace,
then the clause fails the Otherwise BOP test, is invalid under the Section
9-603 strand, and the secured party is liable for breach of the peace.
Given this analysis, the crucial question is this: Is it plausible that
under New York's Revised Article 9 and relevant case law (ex the New
York trilogy as precedent for giving exculpatory power to a Wombles-
like clause) that even when ignoring the Wombles clause's exculpatory
terms the 2014 Wombles court in step two could nevertheless find that
no breach of peace occurred under the facts of the case? If the answer is
yes, then in such an event, the Wombles clause would pass the Otherwise
BOP test, in the sense that its exculpatory effect would be irrelevant
since there would be no breach of peace to exculpate.
198. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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Here lies the genesis of several plausible explanations for
professorial titans' differing views about the efficacy of Wombles-like
clauses in Wombles-like circumstances under Revised Article 9. But to
get to those explanations, this Section first must explore the argument
that under New York law the 2014 Wombles court could find no breach
of peace occurred even where it ignores the Wombles clause's
exculpatory terms. To construct that argument, consider the following
observations.
1. First Observation
Some commentators generally agree that with respect to Article 9's
breach of the peace restriction, "the remedy of self-help repossession is
designed to balance the interests of the secured party and the debtor.
The historic trilogy of personal, property, and societal interests have
played major roles in achieving this balance." 99 As to the personal and
societal interests, they have been described generally as the debtor's
personal interest and society's interest in avoiding violent
confrontations or threat thereof.2 00 As to the property interest, one way
to characterize it is the debtor's interest in not having his real property
(land, home, commercial business) suffer a forceful trespass, such as
breaking and entering, during a repossession.2 01 To the extent different
jurisdictions strike different balances of these three interests when
determining whether a breach of peace occurred, then depending on the
jurisdiction, a repossession clause whose authorized conduct explicitly or
implicitly creates standards measuring the fulfillment of the no breach
of peace duty may or may not run afoul of the Section 9-603 strand.
2. Second Observation
To varying degrees, in each of Cherno, Global Casting, and Wombles,
the secured party entered the debtor's owned or leased commercial
premises when the debtor (or her agent) was not present, the likelihood
of violence was low, the harm to the debtor's real property was minimal,
199. Mikolajczyk, supra note 50, at 355. See, e.g., generally, Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking
Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 1589-93 (2006); Gary J. Edwards, Self-Help Repossession of Software: Should Repossession Be
Available In Article 2B of the UCC?, 58 U. Pr'. L. REV. 763, at n. 74-76 (1997).
200. Id. at 355-56.
201. Id. See also infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
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and the debtor was a non-consumer debtor. In other words, Wombles-
like circumstances obtained in each case. 202 With respect to each of
these circumstances, when determining whether a breach of peace has
occurred, the following broad-brush observations are instructive as to
why a court might be more deferential to a Wombles-like clause in
Wombles-like circumstances (as opposed to non- Wombles-like
circumstances). First, some courts and commentators say that
commercial premises receive less protection than residential premises for
a variety of reasons, including different privacy and security concerns. 203
Second, some courts and commentators suggest that there is a lower
likelihood of violence if neither the debtor, nor any other person, is
present to object to the secured party's entry onto commercial
premises.204 Third, some courts and commentators suggest that there is
a lower likelihood of violence where the harm (e.g., force) done to the
commercial real property is minimal. 205  Fourth, some courts and
202. See supra notes 39-75 and accompanying text.
203. See Barnes, supra note 199, at 1591-92 (stating that "Most clearly, courts have repeatedly
held that entry into an individual debtor's home, absent contemporaneous consent (which is
impossible to obtain when the debtor is absent), will constitute a breach of the peace per se. The
reason for such a strong rule is to honor and protect the private and sacrosanct nature of the
individual home as a refuge from the outside world, though the prevention of potential retaliatory
violence is also a factor . . . . Notably, the same degree of protection has not been afforded to areas
outside the debtor's residences, such as driveways, or to lands owned by commercial enterprises.
This distinction makes sense, for though the law should certainly give some protection to
commercial enterprises, the same privacy and security issues facing individual debtors are not
present with commercial actors. The cases prohibiting entry into an individual's home, absent
contemporaneous consent, are replete with admonitions about the special protection afforded a
person's home, notwithstanding any prior contractual consent granted to a lender."). See also
Mikolajczyk, supra note 50, at 356 (stating in 1977 that, "courts have accorded less protection to
the real property interest of the debtor [than entry into residential structures] and have resolved
the breach of peace issue by focusing more upon -a criminal law definition oriented to the use of
force or violence. A breach of the peace had been found in cases in which entry is gained to such
nonresidential structures as garages or stables by actual physical breaking. When, however, the
structure is open and nonresidential and entry is affected without physical breaking, the traditional
element of a forceful entry is lacking. Thus, entries to an open garage or carport to repossess cars or
to an open hangar to repossesses an airplane are not breaches of peace since the invasion of the
debtor's real property interest is no greater than the law will sanction . . . ."). See also supra notes
24-28, and accompanying text, and infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Emmons v. Burkett, 179 Ga. 838, 348 S.E.2d 323 (1986), rev'd on other grounds
256 Ga. 855, 353 S.E.2d 908, on remand 183 Ga. 654, 359 S.E.2d 691.
205. See also supra notes 24, 25, 28, 190-91, and accompanying text. But see Mikolajczyk, supra
note 50, at 361 (criticizing the Cherno court's demotion of the debtor's real property interest, saying
that "[i]f the rationale for prohibiting forcible entries into nonresidential structures by a secured
party is to protect the debtor's real property interests, there is no justification for [Cherno's]
exception for commercial structures . . . . While it is possible commercial structures are not entitled
to the same degree of protection that courts have extended to residential structures, they should at
least be accorded some protection against fraudulent breaking that occurred in Cherno and the type
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commentators suggest the debtor's real property interest is less
important than the no likelihood of violence standard where the harm
(e.g., force) done to the real property is minimal. 206  Fifth,
unsophisticated consumer debtors receive more protection than
sophisticated commercial debtors; most importantly for this Article's
focus with respect to entry onto commercial premises. 207
3. Third Observation
While still assuming that Cherno, Global Casting and Wombles are
no longer good law for the proposition that a Wombles-like exculpatory
breach of peace clause is effective in Wombles-like circumstances, these
cases remain good law for the basic standards a New York court would
use to determine whether and when a breach of peace occurred in
Wombles-like circumstances. These three cases suggest strongly that of
the "historic trilogy of personal, property, and societal interests"
informing their breach of peace restriction analysis, New York courts in
Wombles-like circumstances consider paramount the debtor's personal
interest and society's interest in avoiding violent confrontations or
of violent breaking that occurred in Wirth. Likewise since cases have held that forceful breaking
into such nonresidential structures as garages or stables is a greater interference with the debtor's
real property interests than the law will permit, it is inconsistent to hold that similar interference
with his interest in a commercial structure is entitled to a lesser degree of protection. Finally, if one
of the justifications for prohibiting intrusions into residential structures is to discourage acts likely
to incite retaliatory violence, a similar rationale, albeit to a lesser degree, should justify an
application of the same prohibition to commercial structures."). See generally Blanchard, Marietta
& Dorsey, supra note 37, at § 15:20 (stating that "General standards about breach of the peace
preclude unauthorized entry into premises owned by the debtor. The rationale for this includes a
judgment that the risk of violence and damaging effects on privacy exceed the benefits that might
flow from permitting the creditor's entry.").
206. See, e.g., Mikolajczyk, supra note 50, at 375. See also sopra notes 24, 25, 28, and
accompanying text.
207. See BLANCHARD, MARIETTA & DORSEY, supra note 37, at § 15:20 (stating that "[a]rguably,
the [consent to enter] clauses are unenforceable in consumer loans and clearly cannot be used to
justify unauthorized entry into a debtor's home. The consumer's residence holds substantial
privacy protection. Furthermore, most consumer contracts are not actually negotiated and, at
most, consent to entry exists only as an artificial concept and thus provides no reliable basis for
action by the creditor . . . . The consent [to enter] clauses are more likely to be enforceable in
commercial agreements and on business premises. In commercial loans, there is a greater
presumption that the terms of the contract were negotiated. Also, privacy interests in business
premises are less than in a personal residence. The cases indicate generally that the clause is
effective, but the degree to which this provides reliable guidance for the creditor should be tempered
by the developing tendency of courts to protect commercial debtors from the literal terms of their
own agreements."). See also supra notes 24-29, 190-93, and accompanying text, and infra note 195,
and accompanying text.
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threat thereof, and demote to legal irrelevancy the debtor's real estate
interest.208 Said the 1990 Wombles court, quoting both Cherno and
Global Casting:
The term "breach of the peace" was defined in People v.
Most, as a "disturbance of public order by an act of
violence or an act likely to produce violence, or which,
by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace
and quiet of the community." . . . Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant breached the peace because they cut a lock,
which Defendant denies. In Cherno v. Bank of Babylon,
. . . the court observed that even though using an illegal
key to enter property to repossess collateral could be
considered breaking and entering, there was nothing in
[that act] that disturbed public order by any act of
violence, caused consternation or alarm, or disturbed the
peace and quiet of the community. Nor was the use of a
key to open the door an act likely to produce violence . .
. . Under the circumstances that existed [at the time],
there was as a matter of law no breach of the peace
.... In Global Casting... ,under a similar set of facts,
the court held that "such an entry, even if the chains
were cut . . . does not, as a matter of law, constitute a
breach of the peace." . . . Thus, even accepting
Plaintiffs' allegations, there was no breach of the peace
in this case.209
Given this quotation, as a shorthand reference for the debtor's and
society's interest, let us say that a breach of the peace occurs under the
"no likely violence standard" where there is a "disturbance of public
order by an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence, or which,
208. As a general matter not limited to New York law, some commentators like Professor
Lawrence say something like the "no likely violence" standard is the basic standard for determining
whether a breach of the peace occurred. Of the Section 9-603(b) strand, recall he states "This
limitation is absolutely necessary. The basic standard that courts have established for determining
whether the secured party has breached the peace is whether there was an intentional disruption of
the peace, an act of violence or a threat likely to cause violence." 11 Anderson U.C.C., supra note 1,
at § 9-603:4. Similarly, Professors Lawrence, Henning, and Frcyermuth say "the Code generally
permits the parties to specify the standards by which the fulfillment of their rights and duties are to
be measured as long as those standards are not 'manifestly unreasonable.' Nevertheless, given the
strong policy in favor of deterring violence, the Code makes clear that a security agreement may not
authorize a secured party to engage in conduct that would otherwise constitute a breach of peace."
LAWRENCE, HENNING & FREYEHMUTi, supra note 193, at 425.
209. Wormbles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 602-03 (internal citations omitted).
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by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the
community." 210 In the 1990 Wombles court opinion, as well as the other
two New York courts' opinions, while each court acknowledged the
harms affecting the debtor's real property interest (in Wombles, for
example, trespassing and by breaking into private commercial property
by cutting a lock), each court held there was no breach of the peace
under the no likely violence standard, and not because of the harm done
to the debtor's real property interest.
What explains the New York courts' apparent demotion in these
cases of the debtor's real property interest to the point of legal
irrelevancy? One possible explanation is that each court gave effect to
their case's respective exculpatory clause to eliminate as a breach of
peace factor the harm done to the debtor's real property interest.21 1 Put
another way, through the clause, the debtor bargained away its ability
to assert its real property interest, at least for the harm actually done to
it by the secured party's entry, and each court respected this bargain in
their breach of the peace analyses. But if that was each court's
reasoning, it is very odd that they did not mention the debtor's real
property interest explicitly as a meaningful factor in its respective
breach of peace analysis, nor discuss the modifying effect their
respective exculpatory clauses had on this interest. The complete
absence of such explicit discussions suggests strongly that no court
directly relied on the exculpatory clause to demote the debtor's real
property interest to legal irrelevance with respect to their breach of
peace analysis. Rather, each court explicitly cited only the no likely
violence standard in its breach of the peace analysis. Further, to the
extent that each court used its respective exculpatory clause to modify
anything, it was the no likely violence standard, the effect of which
arguably contributed to their respective no breach of peace holdings. 212
A more plausible reason for each of the New York courts' apparent
demotion of the debtor's real property interest to the point of legal
irrelevancy in its breach of peace analysis is that, to varying degrees, in
210. Id. at 602.
211. In Cherno, another possible explanation is that at the time of entry, the debtor as lessee had
a diminished real property interest in the leased building. The opinion states that the [lower] court
had authorized "the assignee, upon filing bond and after notice to creditors, to sell the assignor's
physical assets . . . [and that] the key to the premises leased by the assignor [debtor] was in the
assignee's possession." Cherno, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 117. See also infra note 213 for yet another
explanation, but also an acknowledgement that the Cherno court ignored the debtor's real property
interest when finding no breach of peace occurred.
212. But see infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
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each case Wombles-like circumstances obtained. That is, one can argue
that where Wombles-like circumstances obtain, doctrinally (and
normatively) the New York courts do not consider the debtor's real
property interest particularly relevant to their breach of peace analysis,
and instead consider only the no likely violence standard in determining
whether a breach of peace occurred. In other words, the New York
trilogy strongly suggest that in the New York courts, the debtor's real
property interest in Wombles-like circumstances is the least important
breach of peace policy interest (if important at all) when balanced
against the debtor's personal interest and society's interest in avoiding
violence or public disturbance.2 13 Again, each court explicitly discussed
only the no likely violence standard in its breach of the peace analysis,
and not the debtor's real property interest. Because each New York
court found there was insufficient evidence of the likelihood of violence,
each found that no breach of peace had occurred. 214
To be sure, one can find cases from different jurisdictions where in
similar Wombles-like circumstances the courts specifically have cited
lock cutting and other forceful conduct as an important breach of peace
factor because it sufficiently harmed the debtor's real property
interest. 215 This is true even in some cases where the forceful conduct
213. See Mikolajczyk, supra note 50, at 360 (stating that Cherno drew a "further distinction
between the jealous care with which the law protects residential structures and that with which it
protects commercial structures. In Cherno. . . the court held that evidence of the creditor's forcible
breaking by use of a key obtained through unauthorized means was immaterial. The court resolved
the breach of peace issue by applying a strict criminal law analysis of whether a disturbance of the
peace and quiet of the community had occurred. Because such a disturbance had not occurred, the
court held that the actions of the creditor did not rise to the level of a breach of the peace. A
possible explanation for the court's analysis is that the Cherno case arose out of a suit between two
creditors of the debtor [the bank and the debtor's assignee] . . . . In holding that the method of
repossession was not a breach of the peace, the court ignored the debtor's real property interests.
Whether the court would have abandoned the general rule if the suit had been brought by the
aggrieved debtor is open to speculation. Adequate precedent was available for holding that the
fraudulent procurement of a key and an unauthorized entry into a commercial structure was a
breach of the peace.").
214. See supra notes 46, 64, 74, and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1006, 1007 (W.D. Penn.
1982) (commercial premises fence chain cut); Riley State Bank of Riley v. Spillman, 242 Kan. 696,
750 P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1988) (locksmith opened locked door to commercial space). See also
WillTE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, at §34-8, p. 384 ("Many factors influence the breach of peace
issue . . . . A secured creditor who breaks a lock to enter either a debtor's residence or a debtor's
business is likely to be guilty of a breach of the peace. Thus, one court found that a secured creditor
who broke the debtor's mobile home door lock in order to repossess the mobile home breached the
peace. Similarly, a secured creditor who cut a chain that locked the gate to debtor's business
premises committed a breach of the peace. In these instances, the courts rely on the law's historical
protection of premises and its aversion to trespass."). See generally Ronald A. Anderson, Anderson
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had not raised the risk of immediate violence. 21 6 Whether these cases
represent the majority position in not clear,217 but for purposes of
explaining the battle of the titans, empirical certainty on this question is
not necessary. Rather, what is important is that under similar Wombles-
like circumstances, one can make the plausible argument that the New
York trilogy courts appear to have demoted to the point of legal
irrelevancy the debtor's real property interest, and found no breach of
peace occurred solely because there was no likelihood of violence, even
though in other jurisdictions in similar circumstances the debtor's real
property interest violation was a significant factor leading to a finding of
breach of the peace.
4. Fourth Observation
Recall that for each of the three New York cases, some
commentators argue the respective court partially relied on its
exculpatory clause in question to find no breach of peace occurred. Does
this show there is no plausible argument that absent theses clauses, in
2014 a New York court in Wombles-like circumstances could not find no
breach of peace had occurred without relying on the exculpatory clause?
No. Despite this commentary, there is a plausible counter argument
that for each of Cherno,218 Global Casting,219 and Wombles,220 the court
on the Uniform Commercial Code § 9-609:6R (1981) ("Any breaking in, or entering of, a house or
other closed premises, including a fenced-in area, constitutes a breach of the peace.").
216. See e.g., Riley, 242 Kan. 696, 750 P.2d 1024, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 990 (stating "Whether
the breaking of locks by a creditor is per se a breach of the peace is a question which has not been
decided by this court. There are cases in other jurisdictions supporting an answer on either side.
Compare Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc., 539 F. Supp 1006 (W.D.Pa.1982) [finding
breach of peace], with Global [Casting] v. Daley-Hodkin, 105 Misc. 2d 517, 432 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1980)
[finding no breach of peace] ... We hold the Bank breached the peace by breaking the locks to the
Spillmans' place of business. Thus, the repossession of collateral was illegal. A creditor must obtain
possession of the collateral through the courts if entry to the debtor's premises, whether residential
or commercial, can only be obtained through force.") Of the Riley case, Professor Braucher says,
"The rationale for the Riley holding is also not clearly stated in terms of risk of violence because of
a possible confrontation, but rather in terms of the use of force against the debtor's property,
potentially limiting the scope of the rule." Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study ofAdjustment to
Uncertainty in Commercial Law, 75 WASs. U. L.Q. 549 (1997). See generally 86 A Am. Juii. 2D
SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 565, supra note 112 (stating that "There may be a breach of the peace
although there is no violence or physical confrontation, or threat thereof.").
217. There is no empirical study of which the author is aware on this point. Anecdotal evidence,
in some cases quite old, nevertheless exists to support the assertion that this is the majority
position. See supra notes 25, 77, and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 74, 75, and accompanying text. Most interestingly, while the Wombles
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did not need to rely (or in fact may not have actually relied) on the
exculpatory clause to reach a no breach of peace holding. For example,
discussing the former Article 9 in their 1995 UCC Practitioner Treatise,221
Professors White and Summers say that
The effect of a clause in the" security agreement
purporting to authorize non-judicial repossession is
unclear. When such a clause seeks to permit the creditor
to stomp down the door and burst into the debtor's
parlor at any hour of the day or night, the courts do not
hesitate to grant relief to the debtor ... .222
They go on to say, however, that "These clauses may sanction more
refined creditor conduct. . . . In a nineteenth century case, F.A. North
& Co. v. Williams, such a clause exonerated an entry obtained by fraud.
Other courts have approvingly referred to such clauses." 223 One of the
"other courts" they cite is Cherno, and state that "[ilt is impossible to
say whether these references only helped rationalize predetermined
conclusions, or whether they played a determinative role in the decisions.
Surely they are entitled to little weight." 224 The debate suggests that
with respect to cases where Wombles-like circumstances obtain, a New
York court could find that no breach of peace occurred solely under the
no likely violence standard, without reference to an exculpatory
clause.2 25
court explicitly cites to the exculpatory clause in its discussion of trespass liability, it does not
mention the clause when discussing the breach of peace issue. The court does cite with approval
both Cherno and Global Casting with respect to the breach of peace no likelihood of violence
standard, but again makes no mention of whether or how the exculpatory clause affected, if at all,
its breach of peace holding under this standard.
221. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, TIE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PRACTITIONER TREArISE SERIES (1995 4th edition).
222. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 221.
223. Id.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Under Revised Article 9's new statutory prohibition of exculpatory breach of peace clauses,
these "references" to such clauses would be less likely to appear in court opinions. But that
prediction raises the undesirable possibility that with a court like a New York court that was
permitted under the former Article 9 to rely in part on the exculpatory clause, but now is not under
the Section 9-603 strand, if the judge normatively disagrees with this result as being over inclusive
in Wombles-like circumstances, then the judge may simply opine that he did not take into account
the clause when finding no breach had occurred, when, if fact, he did take into account the clause
(consciously or unconsciously). Such a judicial response to the perceived over inclusiveness of the
Section 9-603 strand would add the problem of lack of transparency to the question of the Section
9-603 strand's scope, thus making its answer more, not less, unpredictable and uncertain.
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5. Fifth Observation
Finally, on the road to explaining the battle of the titans over
whether a Wombles-like clause in Wombles-like circumstances is
permitted under Revised Article 9, nothing on the face Revised Article
9's new statutory prohibition bans the conflicting doctrinal (and
normative) positions among jurisdictions discussed above with respect
to the third observation.226 Indeed, where a court under the "but for"
analysis ignores the exculpatory terms of a clause, it is hard to see in the
ensuing breach of peace analysis how the Section 9-603 strand's ban on
contractual waivers, variances, or standards measuring fulfillment of the
duty is implicated. Further, many commentators argue that an
important normative goal of the new statutory prohibition is to ensure
that courts are the sole source of determining whether a breach of peace
occurred under standards derived from Revised Article 9 and its case law
rather than the parties' contract. 227 Consequently, a New York court
like the 2014 Wombles court should be free if it wishes to hold under the
facts of the Wombles case, without taking into consideration the
Wombles clause, that a breach of the peace did not occur because the risk
of violence and community disorder was minimal despite the lock
cutting, and that given the minimal harm done, the debtor's real
property interest was legally insignificant with respect to whether a
breach of peace had occurred. Under that conclusion, the Wombles
clause passes the Otherwise BOP test since even ignoring the Wombles
clause, the 2014 Wombles court could nevertheless still find no breach of
peace had occurred.
Given these observations, one can construct and support the
following argument: In a 2014 New York repossession case where
Wombles-like circumstances obtain, (1) doctrinally a New York court in
its breach of peace analysis could demote the debtor's real property
interest to the point of legal irrelevancy, and focus instead solely on
whether there was a "disturbance of public order by an act of violence or
an act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation and
alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community," 228 and (2) under
this no likely violence standard, the New York court could find no
breach of peace occurred even where it ignores a Wombles-like clause.
226. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
228. Wornbles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 602.
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From this argument spring several plausible explanations for the
battle of the titans. One explanation is that under Wombles-like
circumstances with Wombles-like clauses, the two sets of professors view
differently the continued efficacy of Wombles as "authority" under the
Section 9-603 strand because they hold different doctrinal (and
normative) positions about the appropriate roles of the no likely
violence standard and the debtor's real property interest in Wombles-like
circumstances. A second explanation is that the titans differ about
whether Wombles-like circumstances obtain to a particular repossession,
the result of which is conflicting conclusions about the continued
validity of a Wombles-like clause. In these ways, the two sets of
professors echo the jurisdictional splits discussed above. 229
As to holding different doctrinal (and normative) positions about the
appropriate roles of the no likely violence standard and the debtor's real
property interest in Wombles-like circumstances, recall that Professors
Warren and Walt pose a problem whose facts are based closely on
Wombles', and which substantively sets forth the same repossession clause
as in Wombles. They ask whether the secured party's conduct amounts to
a breach of the peace, and advise students to look to Section 9-602(6) and
Section 9-603(b). They say: "The court in Wombles said that there was
no threat of violence and no breach of the peace. It gave weight to the
exculpatory clause. This would be difficult to do under 9-602(6) and 9-
603(b)." 230 On the one hand, one way to interpret what "this" means is
that they are saying the court modified only the no likely violence
standard with the exculpatory clause, and thus found that no threat of
violence nor a breach of peace had occurred. "This," they say, would be
difficult to do under the Section 9-603 strand. On the other hand, one
wonders whether by "this" they might think the Wombles court also
modified (demoted) the debtor's real property interest through the
exculpatory clause, and thus found "no breach of peace" for that reason
too. In that case, for that reason alone (or combined with the clause's
modifying effect on the no likely violence standard), this might be what
Professors Warren and Walt believe would be "difficult to do" in their
hypothetical under the Section 9-603 strand.231
229. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
230. WARREN & WALT, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 8, at 112 (emphasis added).
231. In this light, Professors Warren and Walt might agree that the clause violates the ex post
Otherwise BOP test if the harm caused to the debtor's real property interest alone, or along with a
low risk of violence, would have amounted to a breach of the peace absent the clause's application.
Further, they might agree that the clause would be invalid under the BOP Definition test or
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In contrast, Warren and Lopucki's textbook problems and
Teacher's Manual discussions suggest that they are contemplating
Wombles-like circumstances obtain in varying degrees, and that in such
circumstances, where the court finds that a forceful act like lock cutting
is not a breach of peace under the no likely violence standard, then for
that reason there should be no breach of the peace despite the lock
cutting. In this sense, they appear to be in accord with (or at least do
not question) the 1990 Wombles court's apparent demotion of the
debtor's real property interest to legal irrelevancy in Wombles-like
circumstances. And given the no breach of peace finding, there would be
no need to resort to an exculpatory clause since there would be no
breach of peace to exculpate. Thus, in that that sense, the Wombles
clause remains valid under the Section 9-603 strand. 232
A second explanation of the battle of the titans is that they differ
about whether Wombles-like circumstances obtain to a particular
repossession, the result of which is conflicting conclusions about the
continued validity of a Wombles-like clause. Consider again that in part
3.2.e of their problem, Professors Warren and Lopucki ask whether
"there is anything that should be in [the secured party's] security
agreement about repossession that might make [the secured party's] job
easier." 233 They state
[n]othing in the security agreement can relieve the
secured party of its obligation to avoid a breach of the
peace through confrontation. The debtor cannot waive
the §9-609 "breach of the peace" limitation. But
Wombles Charters . . . is one of several cases that give
effect to provisions in the security agreement that
consents to entry to land or buildings to effect a
repossession when the debtor is not present.234
It may be telling that Professors Warren and Lopucki say that a
repossession clause may not relieve the secured party of its duty to
refrain from breaching the peace "through confrontation" but that
Professor Lawrence's ex ante analysis. See infra notes 256-62.
232. In contrast, as discussed above, Professors Warren and Walt might agree that the Wombles
clause would be invalid under the BOP Definition test or Professor Lawrence's ex ante analysis.
Here again is an example of the conundrum of conflicting validity outcomes for a Wombles-like
clause depending on the analysis/test used, and the temporal perspective (ex ante vs. ex post)
applied. For further discussion, see infra notes 244-65.
233. WAItItEN & LOPUCKL, TEACIIEHI'S MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38.
234. Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Wombles (gives effect; present tense) "to provisions in the security
agreement that consents to entry to land or buildings to effect a
repossession when the debtor is not present."235 They seem to be signaling
by the italicized language that a Wombles-like clause survives the
Section 9-603 strand because Wombles-like circumstances obtain. 236 In
that case, under the Otherwise BOP test, there would be no breach of
the peace to exculpate anyway. But when non- Wombles-like
circumstances present (i.e., "there is a confrontation," or the debtor is
present at the repossession), then there is a real risk that the no likely
violence standard could (ex ante) and would (ex post) be tripped, thus
leading to a breach of peace. While they do not mention the debtor's
real property interest explicitly, following the idea that where non-
Wombles-like circumstances could and would result in a breach of peace,
perhaps they would agree that the harm caused to the debtor's real
property interest alone (or in conjunction with a resulting higher
likelihood of violence), could and would produce a breach of peace
finding. In each of these examples of non- Wombles-like circumstances,
the Wombles clause's exculpatory power would be relevant since there
could and would be a breach of peace to exculpate. But in that case the
clause would fail the Otherwise BOP test, and would lose its exculpatory
effect. In that case, under non- Wombles-like circumstances, it appears
that Professors Warren and Lopucki would agree with Professors
Warren and Walt that giving exculpatory effect to a Wombles-like clause
would be difficult to do under Revised Article 9.
While admittedly laden with conjecture, let us assume that these
two explanations are correct. In that case, Professors Warren and
Lopucki and Professors Warren and Walt appear to disagree about the
efficacy of Wombles-like clauses where Wombles-like circumstances
obtain. However, they seem to agree that in non-Wombles-like
circumstances, a Wombles-like clause would not exculpate a breach of
the peace found under the no likely violence standard (or even possibly
the debtor's real property interest). But even if the professors agree here
generally, in the particulars they may disagree about whether one or
more Wombles-like circumstances were missing, thus converting the
repossession to a non Wombles-like circumstances. This possibility
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. Recall that Wombles-like circumstances are where the secured party entered the debtor's
owned or leased commercial structure when the debtor (or her agent) was not present, the likelihood
of violence was low, the harm to the debtor's real property was minimal, and the debtor was a
nonconsumer debtor.
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introduces additional explanations for their battle over the continued
efficacy of a Wombles-like clause.
For example, the professors could disagree about whether in the 1990
Wombles case itself there was in fact no likelihood of violence. Certainly
reasonable people when looking at the 1990 Wombles case could reach
different conclusions about whether there was a "disturbance of public
order by an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence, or which,
by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the
community." 237 That is, reasonable people can have different reasonable
assessments of whether under a certain set of circumstances there is or is
not a sufficient likelihood of violence to amount to a breach of the peace.
Reasonable courts have come to different conclusions in similar cases,238
so why not reasonable professors too?
Similarly, perhaps the professors disagreed about whether lock
cutting caused minimal harm to the debtor's real property interest.
Professors Warren and Lopucki may believe a court like Wombles could
reasonably conclude that the harm to the debtor's real property was
minimal, and thus the real property interest was legally irrelevant as a
breach of peace factor. In contrast, Professors Warren and Walt could
reasonably believe in their hypothetical based on Wombles that the harm
was legally significant, thus either tripping the debtor's real property
interest as a determinative or codeterminative factor leading to a breach
of peace finding. Again, reasonable courts have come to different
conclusion in similar cases, 239 so why not reasonable professors too?
In both speculative examples, professors Warren and Lopucki believe
Wombles-like circumstances obtained, while Professors Warren and Walt
believe the opposite, thus leading to conflicting conclusions about the
validity of a Wombles-like clause applied to factually similar repossessions.
That could be an alternative explanation of the battle of the titans.
While these various Otherwise BOP test based explanations seem
plausible with respect to the Wombles clause and Professor Warren and
Lopucki's clause proposed in their problem 3.2.e, the explanations have
less traction in part 3.2.d of the problem. There, Professors Warren and
Lopucki pose the scenario of a secured party wanting to repossess a
bulldozer where the debtor keeps it "in a locked, steel building on the
237. Wombles Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 602.
238. See supra notes 24, 27, 215-17, and accompanying text.
239. Id.
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debtor's own property."2 40 They state that "If our security agreement
has a provision in it authorizing us to pick the lock-or even cut it-
Wombles Charters v. Orix Credit Alliance ... is authority for doing it. Of
course, if there is a confrontation, we will have to withdraw."241 Here again,
one can speculate that they believe that like the 1990 Wombles case,
their problem bears Wombles-like circumstances, and as long as those
Wombles-like circumstances obtain ("there is no confrontation"), then
the no likely violence standard is not tripped, the real property interest
is minimized to legal insignificance, and there is no breach of peace even
ignoring the clause. Seen in this light, Professors Warren and Lopucki's
clause "authorizing us [the secured party] to pick the lock-or even cut
it" would pass the Otherwise BOP test in the sense that there would be
no breach of peace to exculpate with the clause.
What makes this explanation unattractive, however, is that if the
Otherwise BOP test was the reason for why they believe their provision
in security agreement specifically authorizing lock cutting ("If our
security agreement has a provision . . .") is permitted under Revised
Article 9, then they are relying on a provision that is legally irrelevant
under the Otherwise BOP test. Given this observation, had they in fact
been relying on something like the Otherwise BOP test, surely
Professors Warren and Lopucki instead would have omitted the
reference to the legally irrelevant clause and simply said "If the secured
party picks the lock-or even cuts it-Wombles . . . is authority for doing
it." Or perhaps pedagogically more appropriate, something like "If the
secured party picks the lock-or even cuts it-Wombles
. . . is authority for doing it because under New York law, under the
circumstances of the Wombles repossession, arguably no breach
occurred even absent consideration of the clause. Discuss with class
why." This observation means it is highly unlikely that Professors
Warren and Lopucki were contemplating something like the Otherwise
BOP test, at least with respect to problem 3.2.d., and thus it does not
explain the battle of the titans here.
A partial pushback could be that there are several reasons why a
secured party (or professor(s)) nevertheless might include in its security
agreement a repossession clause that is legally irrelevant under the
Otherwise BOP test. First, ex ante, at the time the parties signed the
security agreement, a secured party may not know if Wombles-like
240. WARREN & LoPUCKL, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38.
241. Id. (emphasis added).
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circumstances will obtain in a future, possible repossession, and thus
whether the clause would fail or pass the Otherwise BOP test ex post.
Second, even if the secured party knew the clause would pass the test, and
thus concomitantly be legally irrelevant since there would be no breach of
peace to exculpate, she may find the clause useful for other, nonlegal
exculpatory purposes. Consider that Professors Warren and Lopucki say
the following with regard to another type of repossession clause:
It is nice to have a provision in the security
agreement requiring the debtor 'to assemble the
collateral and make it available,' U.C.C. §9- 6 09(c).
Nearly every debtor will breach this provision in the end,
but its presence may confer some legitimacy on the
secured party's efforts to do what the debtor agreed to do
for it.. . some debtors may feel more inclined to cooperate
when they are reminded of what they signed. 242
The same argument could be extended to a repossession clause that
ex post may turn out to be legally irrelevant under the Otherwise BOP
test. Imagine that during the repossession the debtor is present, making
it initially a non- Wombles-like repossession, the secured party shows the
debtor a copy of the security agreement, reminding him that he
promised to allow the secured party to enter the premises to take the
collateral. That might be enough to persuade some debtors to cooperate
rather than to resist the repossession, thus lowering the likelihood of
violence, and thus lowering the possibility of a breach of peace. 243 On
that score, the clause would be quite useful to the secured party even
though, ex post, had Wombles-like circumstances obtained, it would have
been legally irrelevant.
D. CONFLICTING TESTS AND TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES
The forgoing discussions in this Part have ranged from a straight
statutory analysis of the Section 9-603 strand's requirements, to crafted
242. WAlillEN & LoPUCKi, TEACliER'S MANUAL, supra note 12, at 37-38.
243. For a cautionary note, consider that Professor Sepinuck says that "Parties often include in
their written agreement provisions on remedies for breach. Occasionally, these provisions simply
restate what the law already provides . . . there are reasons to avoid this practice. Expressly
providing for remedies obviously available under the law lengthens the written agreement. More
important, it creates a negative implication that other remedies not mentioned in the agreement,
but which the law would normally additionally or alternatively provide, are not to be available.
Sepinuck, supra note 22, at 3.
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shorthand tests like the Restatement of Law test and the Otherwise
BOP test. This Section will inject into the mix the BOP Definition test.
Along with this shot, it will offer one more possible explanation for the
battle of the titans and other dissenting examples from the
commentariat's consensus that the Section 9-603 strand is very robust.
The additional explanation is that, depending on the analysis/test, and
depending on whether the analysis/test is applied from an ex ante or ex
post perspective, different analyses/tests applied from different temporal
perspectives can lead to opposite conclusions about the validity of the
same clause. 2"
As to the BOP Definition test, some academics and practitioners
characterize the Section 9-603 strand as prohibiting a contractual
definition of breach of the peace. For example, from Professor Harrell's
recounting of the early drafting process with respect to Revised Article
9, it appears that in effect the purpose of what became new Section 9-
603(b) "was to preclude a contractual definition of "breach of the
peace." 245 With more detail, Michael Dunagan says that "Revised
section 9-602(6) specifically prohibits an attempt to agree in the
contract what is or is not a breach of the peace, leaving the courts to
define the limits of the actions a creditor can take." 246  Similarly,
Professor Zinnecker states that
Section 9-603 expressly prohibits parties from attempting to agree
on what actions by a creditor, engaged in self-help repossession, will not
breach the peace. This express prohibition codifies the result reached in
many [former Article 9] cases where creditors unsuccessfully argued that
they did not breach the peace during repossession because their actions
were permitted by provisions in the loan documents. 247
As to the ex ante/ex post dichotomy, in determining whether a clause
is or is not permissible, does the Section 9-603 strand require an ex ante
perspective or an ex post perspective, or are both permissible? Very little
on Article 9's face suggests an answer. 248 Further, little, if anything, in
244. See supra notes 149, 196, and accompanying text.
245. Alvin C. Harrell, 1994 Meetings Refine Proposed Article 9 Revisions, 48 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 326, 327 (1994).
246. Dunagan, supra note 91, at 197.
247. ZINNECKER, supra note 35, at 1123. He also says that "Revised Article 9 prohibits the
parties from attempting to define the parameters of permissible conduct, even through standards
that are not manifestly unreasonable. See U.C.C. § 9-603(b) & cmt. 2 (1998). Id. at n. 186.
248. For example, Section 9-609(b)(2) says the "secured party may proceed under subsection [9-
609(a)(1)] .. . if it proceeds without breach of peace." (emphasis added). The word "proceed(s)" may
suggest that until the secured party is in the act of repossessing, the duty not to breach the peace is
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what the above, and other,249 commentators explicitly say suggests that
the Section 9-603 strand could not be interpreted by a court to prohibit
on an ex ante basis a contractual definition of breach of the peace.
Thus, the BOP Definition test could be applied on an ex ante basis where
the mere act of contractually defining what is or is not a breach of peace
would be prohibited by the Section 9-603 strand, regardless of whether
ex post the court in fact finds the authorized conduct not to be a breach
of the peace. The Article calls this the ex ante BOP Definition test.
Now recall Section C's discussion of the Otherwise BOP test and the
Wombles clause. 25 0 In that discussion, the 2014 Wombles court applied
the Otherwise BOP test from an ex post perspective. Where the court
concluded that under Revised Article 9 and its relevant case law that
there was no breach of peace under the Wombles facts even when
ignoring the clause, the clause passed the ex post Otherwise BOP test.
To be sure, concomitantly the clause became legally irrelevant since
there was no breach of peace to exculpate. 25'
Given the above, a conundrum may occur where different
analyses/tests applied from different temporal perspectives lead to
conflicting outcomes with respect to the validity of a repossession clause.
A hypothetical using the UTG clause is useful to illustrate the
conundrum. Recall that the UTG clause in part says that entry onto the
premises and certain listed, forceful acts such as lock picking and barbed
wire cutting "shall be deemed to have been authorized and not a breach of the
peace if the Lender takes reasonable efforts to safeguard all of the Borrower's
property (e.g. by restringing any barbed wire fences) ?"252 From an ex ante
not implicated. If that is correct, then an ex ante perspective taken before any repossession takes
place would not be permitted with respect to a breach of peace analysis.
249. See 8 Quinn's UCC Commentary & Law Digest § 9-603[A][3] [Rev] (Rev. 2d ed.) (stating
that "[t]he Code does not define the content of the term "breach of the peace," nor is its content
uniform among the various jurisdictions. This might suggest that definition in this area by
agreement might be appropriate. 9-603(b) [Rev] runs counter to this suggestion, however, by
providing generally that the right to determine standards by agreement "does not apply to the duty
under Section 9-609 to refrain from breaching the peace."); RUSCii & SEPINUCK, TEACu Eli'S
MANUAL, supra note 85, at 121-122, (stating that "May the [security] agreement nevertheless help
define what a breach of the peace is?-No . . . section 9-603(b) then indicates that there is no such
authority with regard to the duty not to breach the peace. In short, the parties may not define or
set standards for breach of the peace."); Juliet M. Moringiello, William L. Reynolds, What's
Software Got to do With It? The ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 84 TUL. L. REV.
1541, [text at footnote 49] (2010) (stating that the rule that a creditor must not breach the peace "is
so strong in Article 9 that parties to a security agreement cannot vary it by contract, nor can they
attempt to define breach of the peace in their contracts."). But see supra note 173.
250. See supra notes 128-29, and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 198, and accompanying text.
252. ALCES, IIANSFORD, ET AL., supra note 80, at § 34:45 (emphasis added).
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perspective, before even contesting it in an actual repossession, the UTG
clause fails the BOP Definition test because its language clearly and
explicitly deems certain acts to not be breaches of the peace. Thus ex ante,
the UTG clause is invalid under the Section 9-603 strand.
Now apply the Otherwise BOP test from an ex post perspective.
Before doing so, note that the UTG clause language itself seems to
contemplate a repossession characterized by Wombles-like circumstances:
a nonresidential premises scenario (land, barn), where the likelihood of
violence or public disturbance is low (property not customarily habitated
by people), the harm to the debtor's real property interest is minimal
(cutting or otherwise temporarily moving or removing any barbed wire or
other fencing or similar boundary-maintenance devices, and picking or
otherwise rendering inoperative any locks on gates to barns, pastures; and
the Lender takes reasonable efforts to safeguard all of the Borrower's
property (e.g., by restringing any barbed wire fences)), and the borrower
is a non-consumer debtor (professional farmer with equipment and
employees). 253
Given these anticipated Wombles-like characteristics, 25 4 imagine the
actual repossession does not disappoint. To repossess the debtor's
farming equipment, the secured party enters the debtor's barn at 11:00
p.m. by picking a lock. Neither the debtor, his agent, or third party is
present during the repossession. Thus, neither the debtor, his agent, nor
third party has the opportunity to contemporaneously object to, or
consent to, the repossession. Further, neither the debtor nor his agent
has the opportunity contemporaneously to withdraw the prior
authorization or consent made in a repossession clause to enter the
premises picking a lock. The secured party agents remove the farming
equipment, locking the barn behind them. The next day the debtor
discovers the farm equipment has been repossessed and brings suit
against the secured party for trespass, conversion, and breach of the
peace. With respect to the breach of peace cause of action, the secured
party argues that the UTG repossession clause permitted the agents to
enter the debtor's land, pick the barn lock, and enter the barn, all
without breach of peace liability. The debtor argues that the clause is
invalid under the Section 9-603 strand, and thus the secured party's
breach of peace conduct cannot be exculpated by its application.
253. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
254. As in Section C, one could push back against the characterization of this repossession as
having Wombles-like circumstances.
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Applying the Otherwise BOP test from an ex post perspective, a
New York or like-minded court ignoring the UTG clause could
nevertheless find that under these Wombles-like circumstances, that
there was a low likelihood of violence, and legally insignificant harm
caused to the debtor's real property interest, particularly if the Lender
restrung any barbed wire fences. In that case, the court could conclude
there was no breach of peace even ignoring the clause, and thus it would
pass the Otherwise BOP test, although concomitantly be irrelevant
since there would be no breach of peace to exculpate.
So here we have the conundrum that two different Section 9-603
strand tests applied from two different temporal perspectives lead to
opposite conclusions about the validity of the same UTG clause. Why
does this matter? After all, if ex post under the functional Otherwise
BOP test a clause passes muster since there is no breach of peace even
when ignoring the clause, who cares if ex ante the clause violates the
BOP Definition test? If no harm, then no foul.
There are two reasons to care. First, the conundrum may help
explain the Lawrence clause vs. UTG clause conflict. 255 Second, the
conundrum raises interesting normative questions. As to the Lawrence
clause vs. UTG clause conflict, recall that Professor Lawrence believes the
Lawrence clause is prohibited under the new statutory prohibition. Of
the Section 9-603 strand, he says "This limitation is absolutely necessary.
The basic standard that courts have established for determining whether
the secured party has breached the peace is whether there was an
intentional disruption of the peace, an act of violence or a threat likely to
cause violence .... "256 He goes on to say with respect to the prohibited
Lawrence clause, "[a]ny such contractual provision would have too great
a tendency to lead to a violent confrontation." 257 Note, he does not say
the Lawrence clause is prohibited only if it in fact led (ex post) to "an
intentional disruption of the peace, an act of violence or a threat likely to
cause violence." Rather, he says the clause is prohibited because it
"would have too great a tendency to lead to a violent confrontation." 258
As mentioned above, Professor Lawrence appears to be adopting an ex
ante perspective: Prohibited clauses are those whose authorized conduct
"would have too great a tendency to lead to a violent confrontation," 259 and
255. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
256. 11 ANDERSON U.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-603:4.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 170, 181, 185, and accompanying text. It is Professor Lawrence's phrase
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thus to give such clauses exculpatory power would conflict with "[t]he
basic standard that courts have established for determining whether the
secured party has breached the peace [namely] . . . whether there was an
intentional disruption of the peace, an act of violence or a threat likely to
cause violence." 260 From this ex ante perspective, the Lawrence clause
would violate the Section 9-603 strand even if (1) the authorized conduct
had not yet occurred because no repossession had yet occurred, or (2) ex
post the repossession had occurred, but the authorized conduct had not
taken place, or (3) ex post the authorized conduct had taken place, but it
in fact did not lead to "an intentional disruption of the peace, an act of
violence or a threat likely to cause violence." 261 This ex ante invalidity
outcome for the UTG clause mirrors that of the BOP Definition test
applied on an ex ante basis, as discussed above. 262
In contrast, perhaps the UTG author and editors believe their
clause is valid under the Section 9-603 strand because they see the
strand as something like an ex-post Otherwise BOP test rather than an
ex ante BOP Definition test. In that case, given the UTG clause's
anticipated Wombles-like circumstances, if they obtained in an actual
repossession, the clause's authorized conduct would not be considered a
breach of a peace. Consequently, even if the clause's express language
violates the ex ante BOP Definition test (or Professor Lawrence's ex ante
analysis), 263 if ex post it passed something like the Otherwise BOP test,
then no harm, no foul.
This then could explain the Lawrence clause vs. UTG clause
conflict.264 Professor Lawrence thinks his clause is invalid under his ex
"would have too great a tendency to lead" that implicates an ex ante perspective of before a
repossession has occurred rather than an ex post perspective of after the repossession has occurred.
To see this more clearly, substitute the word "probability" for "tendency." Now his statement
reads that a clause is prohibited where it "would have too great a probability to lead to a violent
confrontation." In this light, arguably he is not saying the conduct would (i.e., definitely) lead to
violence, but rather that it could (i.e., might, or might not) lead to violence.
260. See supra notes 170, 181, 185, and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 170, 181, 185, and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 249, 250, and accompanying text.
263. On the one hand, given the contemplated Wombles-like circumstances, the UTG clause
might also pass the Professor Lawrence's ex ante analysis that the authorized conduct "would have
too great a tendency to lead to a violent confrontation." On the other hand, in a non-New York
jurisdiction, it might not pass. Note though that the possibility of such a debate largely is
eliminated if one uses the ex ante BOP Definition test because the UTG clause clearly creates a
definition of what conduct would be deemed not to be a breach the peace. Perhaps the UTG clause
might still be saved but an ex ante Restatement of Law test, but that too is debatable.
264. Other things might explain the Lawrence clause vs. the UTG clause conflict. For example,
when using the word "premises" in his clause, Professor Lawrence could be contemplating a
consumer debtor's residence, in which case he is certainly correct his clause would not pass muster
Vol. 10:2344
Summer 2014 THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF REVISED ARTICLE 9
ante perspective analysis, while the UTG folks think theirs is valid under
something like the Otherwise BOP test's ex post perspective. 265
The second reason one should care about the different validity
outcomes for a clause under the Section 9-603 strand depending on the
analysis/test used and the temporal perspective adopted is that this
conundrum raises interesting normative questions. For lack of space,
the Article identifies only a selected few. For example, between
conflicting validity outcomes for the same repossession clause, how
should a court identify the correct one? What penalty or other
damages, if any, should the secured party suffer for using a clause that
under the ex ante BOP Definition test is clearly invalid, but which is
legally irrelevant after applying the ex post Otherwise BOP test? Are
there reasons to deter secured parties from putting such clearly ex ante
invalid clauses in contracts? Consider a repossession with non- Wombles-
like circumstances where a consumer-debtor's car is to be repossessed
from her driveway. During the repossession, imagine the debtor is
present. In these circumstances, might there be a heightened risk that
an unsophisticated debtor, when shown by the repo men a copy of the
security agreement containing the ex ante invalid clause, would
acquiesce to the authorized conduct; but, in contrast, absent being
shown the invalid clause, the debtor would have objected to such
conduct? Under these circumstances, should a court find that the
debtor contemporaneously consented to the conduct, and for that reason
under Revised Article 9. Contrariwise, the UTC clause seems to contemplate Wombles-like
circumstances, including entry into a non-residential structure. Even if this explanation were true,
it does not answer whether or why Professor Lawrence would arrive at the same ex ante clause
invalidity outcome if he knew his clause was to be used in Wombles-like circumstances.
265. The possibility these conflicting validity outcomes could occur is not purely theoretical, nor
is it confined to the commentary. Consider In re Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc., 436 B.R. 582,
(Bkrtcy. D. Idaho, 2010). In Walter, the court adopted an ex ante perspective when determining
that a commercial reasonableness clause was manifestly unreasonable as a matter of law, and thus
invalid under Revised Sections 9-602 and 9-603(a). Id. at 596-97. The limited point made here is
that the Walter court did not first review the facts of the contested repossession sale, and then
determine whether the clause's exculpatory terms were manifestly unreasonable and thus invalid.
Rather, it read the clause, considered Revised Section 9-610(b)'s requirement that "every aspect of
a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be
commercially reasonable," and then held as a matter of law that the clause's exculpatory terms
were manifestly unreasonable. In contrast to this ex ante perspective, in another part of the 1990
Wombles opinion, in reviewing whether a clause affecting standards measuring the fulfillment of the
commercial reasonableness duty were manifestly unreasonable, the Wombles court conducted an ex
post analysis of the disputed sale conduct (e.g., advertising), holding the clause's standards were not
manifestly unreasonable and that the secured party had complied with those standards. Wombles
Charters, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 601.
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there is no breach of the peace? 26 6 Or should the court use the Section
9-603 strand prohibit this ex ante invalid clause's squelching effect upon
the consumer debtor?2 67 If so, what would the doctrinal analysis and
normative justification(s) look like? These would be interesting
questions for a professor to have with his class.
266. In that event, one might argue that the Section 9-603 strand's scope is underinclusive. See
also supra notes 242-43, and accompanying text.
267. See generally In re 53 Foot Trawler Pegasus, 2008 WL 4938345 (M.D. Fla.), 2009 A.M.C.
435, 67 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 839 (2008) ("If a creditor is allowed to unofficially use the powers of the
state to squelch potential breaches of the peace, he can effectively evade or avoid the statute.").
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